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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ICARUS IN CHINA:  WESTERN AVIATION AND THE CHINESE AIR FORCE, 
1931-1941 
John Alexander Lance, M.A. 
Western Carolina University (July 2014) 
Director:  Dr. David Dorondo 
 Between 1931 and 1941, General Jiang Jieshi (commonly referred to as “Chiang 
Kai-Shek” in the West) and the Chinese Nationalists—the Guomindang—battled internal 
rivals, as well as Japanese military forces, for control of China.  Even though Jiang Jieshi 
was able to consolidate most of the aviation assets inside China under his command, the 
Japanese Imperial Army and Navy possessed large numbers of domestically produced 
aircraft and the well-trained aircrew needed to operate them.  While the Chinese 
Nationalist armies could offset Japanese ground forces with superior numbers and 
strategic defense-in-depth, the Chinese Air Force was completely unprepared for 
extended operations against Japanese fighters and bombers.  In an effort to close this 
aviation gap with the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists employed a wide variety of 
European and American aviation advisors to improve the effectiveness of the Chinese Air 
Force.  In the mid-1930s, Italian aviation advisors conducted basic flight training and 
assembled kit-built aircraft for the Chinese Air Force.  Great Britain also sold a large 
number of civilian and military aircraft to various Chinese leaders during the early 1930s.  
However, the majority of aviation assistance came from two nations—the Soviet Union 
and the United States.  The Soviet Union dispatched Red Army aviation advisory units to 
aid the Guomindang after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1937 
and the subsequent departure of German military advisors in 1938.  American flyers, 
such as John Jouett and Claire Chennault, were hired by Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi to 
provide advanced flight training for the Chinese Air Force and to lobby the United States 
government for military aid during the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Due to diplomatic 
developments, and with the exception of a small number of Soviet and American flight 
instructors, almost all foreign training and logistical support for the Chinese Air Force 
had ceased by the end of 1940.  When the Soviet Union, Imperial Japan and Nazi 
Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, the Soviet Union agreed to end all 
direct combat operations against Japanese forces in China, Mongolia and Manchuria by 
July 1939.  In desperation, Chinese and American leaders agreed to fund, equip and 
deploy a small number of civilian “volunteers” that would fly fighter aircraft in direct 
support of Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalist forces.  This group was officially called the 1st 
American Volunteer Group (AVG) but was later nicknamed “The Flying Tigers.”  While 
small groups of Soviet and American advisors would remain in the employ of the 
Chinese Air Force throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Chinese Air Force 
would cease to present any kind of organized threat to Japanese military forces after the 
departure of Soviet combat squadrons and the arrival of the AVG. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 On July 28, 1941, a small Dutch freighter named the Penang Trader crept past the 
intersection of the Yangon and Bago Rivers in southern Burma.  The golden spire of the 
Shwe Dagon pagoda was just visible over the low-lying buildings of colonial Rangoon.  
Rangoon, which ironically translates into “End of Strife,” was the disembarking point for 
the initial cadre of the 1st American Volunteer Group (AVG), a unit that would soon 
become universally known as the Flying Tigers.1  Rather than signaling the end of strife, 
however, the arrival of these pilots and ground crewmen would herald the start of direct 
U.S. military operations against Japan and the end of a cautious and deliberately informal 
aviation advisory effort that had been advising and training the Nationalist Chinese Air 
Force for the past decade.  For the leadership of both the United States and China, the 
time for providing assistance and support was past and only the direct intervention of 
U.S. military aircraft, flown by recently-separated U.S. military personnel, could prevent 
the unopposed bombing of Chinese cities by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.  
However, this was not the first time in recent memory that an outside power had fought 
against Japanese fighters and bombers on China’s behalf.  Between 1937 and 1940, the 
Soviet Union deployed entire squadrons of Soviet fighter and bomber aircraft to China in 
an attempt to prevent a Japanese victory over the Guomindang, the Chinese Nationalists 
government of Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi.  In many ways, the arrival of this American 
                                                          
1 Paul Frillmann and Graham Peck,   China:  The Remembered Life (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1968,) 62-63.  The Flying Tigers did almost all of their training and initial build-up in Burma, a situation 
that caused some tension between Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi, a staunch foe of British imperialism, and the 
British colonial officials who were letting the AVG use their port facilities and airspace. 
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unit in the summer of 1941 could be seen as the continuation of a Chinese policy that 
recognized the limits of China’s own military aviation and was willing to request foreign 
assistance against the Guomindang’s Japanese adversary. 
This effort to send American aviators to fight China’s aerial battles was a sharp 
departure from the U.S. policies of the preceding decade.  Starting with an American 
advisory group led by Colonel John Jouett in 1932, the Chinese Nationalist 
government—with the often reluctant approval of the United States government—had 
been employing a steadily increasing number of American businessmen and ex-military 
aviators.  These individuals served as foreign advisors for the growing Chinese Air Force 
that had been recently consolidated under the control of the Guomindang.  American 
aircraft companies such as Curtiss-Wright, North American and Seversky Aviation would 
build aircraft factories and repair depots in China.  The high-point of this commercially-
organized advisory effort was the first half of 1937, when Jiang Jieshi hired Claire 
Chennault and the Chinese Air Force began to benefit from the expansion of American 
aircraft sales under the direction of a Curtiss-Wright representative named William 
Pawley.  Chennault, who would later achieve wide-spread fame as the leader of the 
Flying Tigers, would serve Jiang Jieshi and Soong May-Ling (known in the West as 
Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang, respectively) as their principal aviation advisor 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the principal architect of the Chinese air raid 
early warning system.  The war with Japan was not going well in mid-1941, however, 
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and it was due to Japanese control of Chinese coastal waters that Jiang Jieshi and 
Chennault had been forced to consolidate and train the 1st AVG in Burma.2   
 Three months prior to the arrival of the Flying Tigers in Rangoon, Japan and the 
Soviet Union signed the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact.  Besides allowing Soviet leader 
Josef Stalin to concentrate on Europe and reassuring the Japanese leadership with regards 
to Soviet incursions across the borders of Manchuria and Mongolia, this pact officially 
ended direct Soviet aviation support to the Guomindang.  This agreement represented an 
unfortunate reversal of fortune for the Chinese Nationalists.  During the early and mid-
1930s, the Soviet Union had provided Chinese aviation schools with a small number of 
advisors, mechanics and industrial specialists before the Guomindang had ended this 
official collaboration.  This Sino-Soviet relationship was revived with the resumption of 
open war between China and Japan in 1937.  The Soviet Union and the Guomindang 
signed a Non-Aggression Treaty that opened the door for active Soviet air operations 
against the Japanese.  Between August 1937 and April 1941, hundreds of Soviet airmen 
flew Soviet-built fighter and bomber aircraft in direct support of Chinese Nationalist 
operations against Imperial Japan.  However, with the later signing of a Neutrality Pact 
with Japan, the Soviet Union ended its active support of Jiang Jieshi’s rapidly dwindling 
air force.  Without the presence of Soviet aircrews, the Chinese Air Force confronted the 
                                                          
2 Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and his American Volunteers, 1941-1942, Revised Edition 
(Washington, DC:  Smithsonian Books, 2007,) 8-16.  In 1934, Curtiss-Wright built the largest aircraft 
factory on Chinese soil.  By 1937, this factory employed over three thousand Chinese workers and 
technicians and was preparing to build two Vultee V-II bombers a week at 20 percent of the cost of a 
similar imported airframe.  Unfortunately, this aircraft production facility was one of the first targets of the 
Japanese air campaign and the Chinese Nationalists never produced any significant numbers of 
domestically built aircraft  
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aviators of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy with only a small number of foreign 
volunteers and a rapidly shrinking pool of flyable aircraft. 
Between the departure of Soviet Air Force units and the slow build-up of the 
American volunteer unit, 1940 and 1941 would be the two worst years of the conflict for 
the Chinese Air Force.  This setback with regards to Chinese airpower would hold grave 
consequences for the Chinese Nationalists.  Prior to the introduction of aerial warfare, the 
Japanese had been limited in what they could achieve on the battlefield against the 
millions of soldiers that any Chinese leader could organize against a foreign invader.  
With the advent of aerial combat, however, warfare had been expanded into a third 
dimension.  Chinese cities that had previously been safe from attack were now threatened 
by Japanese bombers.  Chinese divisions now required the protection of their own air 
force if they were to conduct any sort of effective campaign on the ground.  Chinese 
industry was now expected to not only produce the uniforms, weapons, and supplies 
required for a ground army, but also build and repair the sophisticated aircraft needed for 
a modern air force.  Chinese military leaders also needed to establish and staff the schools 
and academies necessary for the training of the aircrew and mechanics that would operate 
and maintain these complex war machines.  Airpower also became an important 
component of the internal wars that erupted shortly after the collapse of the Imperial 
government in 1911.  Calling on a centuries-old tradition of hiring foreign mercenaries, 
Jiang Jieshi and other warlords used a wide variety of European and American aviation 
advisors to train their air forces during the internal Chinese conflicts of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.  Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang eventually emerged as the strongest 
political force in China and consolidated the scattered air assets of the various warlords 
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under their control.  By 1932, the Nationalist government was convinced that China 
should possess a large and capable air force and that both external and internal threats to 
Chinese peace and stability could be defeated with the help of modern aviation.  
According to historian Guangqiu Xu, “the Nationalist government grew increasingly “air 
minded,” and decided first to concentrate on the development of the air force.  In the 
meantime, it made wide use of the slogan “Hangkong Qiukuo” [National salvation by the 
use of aircraft] to arouse the interests of the Chinese people in developing the Nationalist 
military aviation.”3   While the Nationalists would experiment with foreign aviation 
advisors from Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, it would require the resumption 
of open warfare with Japan in 1937 to convince Jiang Jieshi and the leaders of his 
fledgling air force that the United States and the Soviet Union were the two most capable 
nations in terms of aviation training and support.   
Beginning in 1937, the Chinese Air Force tried to conduct an intense 
modernization program while under constant pressure from a skillful and well-equipped 
Japanese adversary.  The Soviet Union and the United States shipped large numbers of 
military aircraft to China and the Nationalist government hired an eclectic mix of Soviet 
and American aviation advisors to train the battered Chinese Air Force as they faced 
direct attack by Japanese fighter and bomber forces.  This thesis will show that, due to a 
number of political, organization and cultural factors, both U.S. and Soviet attempts to 
train the Chinese Air Force would fail.  Both the Soviets and the Americans employed 
                                                          
3 Guangqiu Xu, War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929-1949 (Westport, CT:  
Greenwood Press, 2001,) 57.  By 1937, the Nationalist government of China was the single biggest 
importer of American aircraft in the world and probably possessed the largest number of American airmen 
and support personnel of any location outside the continental United States. 
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advisory organizations that should have made a positive impact upon the development of 
an independent Chinese Air Force.  However, the USSR and the US would ultimately fail 
in this complex mission, though for slightly different reasons.  Politically, the Soviet 
Union and the United States both lacked the sort of long-term, official commitment to an 
independent Chinese air capability that could have defended Chinese airspace against 
Japanese attack.  The Soviet Union was primarily concerned about the security of its 
eastern borders and viewed the advisory mission in China as a useful way to bleed the 
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy without the large-scale use of Soviet troops.  The 
United States would try to have the best of both worlds by attempting simultaneously to 
sell large numbers of military aircraft to the Guomindang while also avoiding any 
involvement with the various conflicts that were taking place on Chinese territory.  
Organizationally, the Soviet Union and the United States would, at different times, 
fluctuate between piecemeal training efforts based on the talents of individual flyers and 
the wholesale introduction of entire squadrons commanded by non-Chinese officers.  
Culturally, the Soviet Union and the United States both grossly underestimated the huge 
impact that language barriers, interpersonal relationships, and the absence of a 
mechanical sub-culture would have on any attempt to build a Chinese Air Force that 
would be capable of effective, independent operations against a modern adversary such 
as Japan.   
This thesis argues that both the introduction of Soviet Red Army aviation units 
dedicated to non-advisory operations—and the later arrival of the 1st AVG—effectively 
signaled the end of any attempts to field an effective air force flown and maintained by 
Chinese airmen.  By becoming completely reliant on Soviet and American advisors and 
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combat units, the Chinese Air Force was never forced to develop the training programs 
and organizational structures tailored to Chinese culture and Chinese Nationalist political 
goals.  Both of these advisory efforts would also fail to understand the almost organic 
nature of airpower, especially in terms of the support infrastructures needed to build and 
sustain a domestic aviation capability.  American and Soviet advisors would each attempt 
to mold the Chinese Nationalist Air Force in their respective images with a variety of 
programs and initiatives that ultimately failed to have the desired effect.  In terms of 
historiography, both the American and the Soviet aviation programs during this period 
have been analyzed with almost exclusively economic, political, or biographical 
frameworks.  Authors such as Guangqiu Xu have focused on the numbers of aircraft 
imported and the economic resources dedicated to the Chinese Air Force, while other 
aviation historians such as Daniel Ford, Martha Byrd or Jack Sampson have analyzed 
early aviation in China by examining the personal accounts of men like Claire Chennault 
or William McDonald.  This thesis expands the historiography of this subject by 
including the overall political, organizational and cultural aspects of these aviation 
advisory programs and describing the complex nature of aviation training, especially in a 
foreign context. 
Although Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang would still possess an air service 
made up of Chinese personnel and equipment after 1941, this battered force was wholly 
dependent on American personnel, material, and training support in order to conduct 
anything resembling effective operations.  Once American support was removed at the 
end of the Second World War, it would soon become apparent just how ineffective the 
Chinese Nationalist Air Force had been during the course of the Second Sino-Japanese 
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War.  Unlike other historical accounts of early Chinese aviation, this thesis will argue that 
large and increasingly diverse infusions of Western aircraft and equipment actually had a 
detrimental effect on the air component of the National Revolutionary Army and, in a 
seemingly paradoxical manner, help contribute to its destruction during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. 
Finally, this thesis posits that it was the political, organizational and culture 
aspects of the American and Soviet advisory efforts that contributed to the demise of the 
Chinese Nationalist Air Force rather than a lack of material support or failure to provide 
sufficient funding.  If anything, this constant injection of modern, Western military 
aircraft merely provided new vehicles with which the Chinese Air Force could lose 
increasingly large numbers of aviators to both Japanese fighters and the constant attrition 
of adverse weather, shoddy maintenance and inadequate training.  Paradoxically, the 
greater the efforts made by Soviet and American airmen to “help” their Chinese hosts, the 
greater the long-term damage inflicted upon a Chinese Air Force that, in the end, felt it 
had no choice but to depend upon foreign assistance. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  AMERICAN MISSIONARIES OF THE AIR 
 
 
In 1931, Colonel John Jouett appeared to be the perfect aviation advisor for a 
foreign flying school.  A veteran of the First World War, Jouett had served as the 
commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps Training Command during the late 1920s.  
However, Jouett had retired in 1930 in order to run the Aviation Department of the 
Standard Oil Company.4  When the Nanjing government of Chinese warlord Jiang Jieshi 
approached the U.S. government in April 1932 and requested an American training 
group, the Commerce Department recommended Jouett.  Jouett was reluctant to sign on 
to such an unusual tasking but relented when Assistant Secretary of Commerce Clarence 
Young insisted that Jouett’s participation would be of great service to the United States.   
Despite being a recently retired colonel in the U.S. Army, the U.S. government 
considered Jouett a civilian and the State Department agreed to authorize travel for Jouett 
and the fourteen former military instructors selected for this mission.  By May, Jouett and 
the Commerce Department had crafted a training plan for the proposed Nationalist air 
force and Jouett’s group arrived in Hangzhou on July 8, 1932.5 
The Jouett training mission represented the first attempt by Jiang Jieshi’s 
government to establish the foundations of a modern, Western-style air force that could 
eventually compete with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy for control of Chinese 
airspace.  However, the hiring of American instructors was not a new concept for Nanjing 
                                                          
4 William M. Leary, Jr., “Wings for China: The Jouett Mission, 1932-1935,” Pacific Historical Review, 
Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov 1969), 452-453. 
5Xu, 60-62. 
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or any other military clique inside China.  Jiang Jieshi and other warlords had employed 
American aviators to train Chinese airmen and fly combat missions since the mid-1920s.  
American pilots such as Bert Hall, Floyd Shumaker and Robert M. Short flew in support 
of Guomindang objectives prior to 1932 and also acted as sales representatives and 
product demonstrators for U.S. aircraft companies.  In September 1931, a Japanese attack 
on Chinese units in Manchuria provided an even greater incentive for Jiang Jieshi and 
other military leaders to hire Western aviation experts to off-set Japanese advantages in 
the air.  However, these first American aviators were mercenaries, hired directly by Jiang 
Jieshi to carry out individual tasks based on whatever skills they brought to China.  The 
presence of these early American aviators and their actions as private citizens would 
present problems for the U.S. government.  Bert Hall was an experienced airman and a 
former member of the Lafayette Escadrille, but was eventually charged by Nanjing 
government with “misappropriating” twenty thousand dollars that had been provided to 
purchase refurbished aircraft in the United States.  The United States charged Hall with 
theft in 1933 and imprisoned him in the MacNeil Island Federal Penitentiary until his 
release in 1936.  Shumaker was a former major in the U.S. Army who had moved to 
Shanghai in 1929 as the president of the China Aviation Equipment Company.  While 
employed by Jiang Jieshi, Shumaker produced an ambitious expansion plan for the 
Nationalist Air Force that included the creation of a Ministry of Aviation, the building of 
an airdrome system centered on Nanjing and the eventual purchase of almost a hundred 
Douglas multi-purpose aircraft.6  These plans fell apart when Shumaker was unable to 
secure the needed funding.  Robert Short, a former Army lieutenant and Army Air Corps 
                                                          
6Ibid., 44-45. 
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pilot, had originally traveled to China to demonstrate a Boeing fighter prototype and push 
the sales of Boeing aircraft in China.  However, when Japanese aircraft attacked the cities 
of Nanxiangzhen and Suzhou Station, Short disrupted the bomber formations with his 
prototype and successfully shot down two Imperial Japanese Naval pursuit aircraft.  
Unfortunately, the Japanese shot down and killed Short on February 22, 1932, an incident 
that the Japanese government immediately pounced upon as proof of an American breach 
of neutrality.7 
The notion of American neutrality would have a profound impact on U.S. aviation 
activities inside China.   Politically, the United States was constrained by domestic 
realities and international agreements that prevented any type of long-term planning with 
regards to East Asia.  Since 1929, ending the Great Depression had become a top priority 
for all Americans, leading to the reinforcement, if not continuation, of the isolationist 
policies crafted during the 1920s.  American leaders felt that any military involvement 
with foreign powers, especially those in Asia, would only lead to the sort of “foreign 
entanglements” condemned by early American icons such as George Washington.  For 
example, in 1931, the Nanjing Minster of Finance, T.V. Soong, asked the U.S. 
government for permission to send twelve experienced Chinese aviators to the United 
States for advanced instruction in organizational and logistical procedures.  The War 
Department informed the Chinese legation that “U.S. policy mandated acceptance of no 
more than two foreign students in the military flying school at one time.”8  The Nanjing 
government recognized this policy for the polite form of “No” that it really was and 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 60. 
8 Ibid. 
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dropped the request.  This reluctance to engage with foreign military organizations 
extended to the sales of military equipment as well.  In 1923, President Warren G. 
Harding established a policy forbidding the sale of new or surplus military equipment to 
anyone, even U.S. citizens, unless guarantees were in place that the equipment would not 
be used in foreign civil conflicts.9  This ban on international military sales was viewed by 
American politicians as a logical extension of the Arms Embargo Agreement of 1919.  
The 1919 Agreement was a direct result of British and American leaders citing war 
profiteers and “merchants of death” as one of the root causes of the First World War.  
Therefore, the exporting of any military machinery, especially machinery as potentially 
destructive as aircraft, would have to overcome post-war concerns about provoking or 
prolonging foreign warfare in the interests of commercial profit.10  Both the State and 
Commerce Departments realized that such a policy, while admirable from a humanitarian 
point of view, put American industry and diplomacy at a severe disadvantage with 
respect to rival powers that had no such restrictions on military sales.  International arms 
sales were not only economically beneficial for the exporting nations, but they also 
provided exporting nations the diplomatic and industrial access required to have any sort 
of influence over events in a foreign nation.  Without the international ties produced by 
arms sales and foreign training programs, the U.S. government would soon find itself at a 
distinct disadvantage compared to the British, French, Italian, German, and Soviet 
diplomats who were more than willing to provide advanced military equipment to Jiang 
Jieshi and his government in Nanjing.  The American prohibition on arms sales to 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 41. 
10 Edward L. Dreyer.  China at War, 1901-1949  (New York:  Longman Publishing, 1995), 80-81. 
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combatants in foreign conflicts would only be amended in 1930 by President Hoover 
when aircraft industry leaders pointed out the economic benefits that would result from a 
modification of Harding’s policy.  With the influx of U.S. aircraft and advisors following 
the lifting of this ban, the Chinese Nationalist air force began to exert a decisive influence 
in the battles being fought between Jiang Jieshi and the opposing warlords to the north 
and south of Nanjing.   
The U.S. government, however, continued to view Jiang Jieshi and the 
Guomindang as just another foreign customer for American industry and made little 
attempt to organize, train or coordinate the independent activities of American instructors 
and sales representatives working with the Nationalist Air Force in the early 1930s.  In 
fact, the Commerce Department would be the only government agency with any authority 
or oversight regarding sales and training programs in China, a role that should have 
included strong representation from the State and War Departments at a minimum.  
However, neither of those vital departments wished to participate in foreign military 
training.  The Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, rejected any notion of 
assisting the Jouett mission when he stated that “the War Department is not interested in 
sending an aviation training mission to China.”11  The State Department was also not 
interested in assisting China, primarily because “it did not wish to antagonize the 
Japanese or appear to be promoting the sales of munitions…”12  This restricted approach 
to international aircraft sales would not change even after the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931.  Unlike the constant battles that the Nationalist military forces fought 
                                                          
11 Leary, 451. 
12 Ibid. 
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against the Communists and other internal rivals, the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy 
were well-led and well-equipped military organizations supported by a robust aerial 
capability.  Jiang Jieshi and the rest of the Guomindang leadership realized that even 
halting Japanese incursions into Chinese territory, much less pushing them back, would 
involve much more than simply throwing columns of half-trained Chinese infantry 
against Japanese divisions armed with the latest in modern weaponry.  Jiang Jieshi would 
attempt to minimize Japan’s seizure of Manchuria by stating that “the Japanese are a 
disease of the skin; the Communists are a disease of the heart,” but it was not a 
coincidence that Nationalist requests for foreign military advisors increased exponentially 
following the “Mukden Incident.”13  If the Japanese were to ever attack the southern 
portions of China in the near future, the Guomindang needed a modern, well-equipped 
Nationalist Air Force if their ground forces were to have any hopes of victory. 
With this increased emphasis on providing advanced Western training and 
organization to the Chinese Nationalists, the Jouett mission represented a golden 
opportunity for the U.S. government.  An organized training group would finally provide 
the Nanjing government an official training group for the establishment of a Western-
style military flight school.  Jouett was methodical in his selection of advisory personnel.  
Besides the instructor pilots requested by the Nanjing government, the training group 
included a flight surgeon, four mechanics and a secretary.14  Jouett and his advisors were 
initially successful in their attempts to build a modern military aviation academy at 
Hangzhou, located 100 miles south of Shanghai.  Under the program authorized by 
                                                          
13 Dryer, 173. 
14 Leary, 453. 
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Nationalist Finance Minister T.V. Soong, Chinese aviation cadets would receive seventy 
hours of basic training, seventy hours of primary flight training and seventy hours of 
advanced training.  This plan would train 150 pilots in three years and cost just over 
thirteen million U.S. dollars.15  Some of the problems that Jouett immediately addressed 
were the command and control structure and the promotion and pay system used by the 
Nationalist Air Force.  Jouett recommended that all aviation command be removed from 
the Minister of War and replaced with a General Headquarters Air Force that would 
answer directly to Jiang Jieshi.  This was a move that the head of the Guomindang 
enthusiastically endorsed since it placed him in a position to directly control this vital 
aspect of his military modernization program.16  However, Jouett and his instructors soon 
realized that their task would be far more difficult than they had originally envisioned.   
Organizationally, the American advisors were attempting to turn a Chinese 
program into an American program.  Jouett was using the same training policies and 
procedures used at Randolph Field, the Army Air Corps training base in San Antonio, 
Texas.  This presented a problem because those policies and procedures were designed 
for English-speaking graduates of U.S. high schools who had been raised in an American 
culture.  Some aviation historians have criticized the Air Corps training program for 
being arbitrary and inefficient and pointed out that the Army Air Corps was infamous in 
the 1920s and 1930s for washing out large numbers of potential pilots.  Claire Chennault, 
considered one of the great fighter pilots of the early U.S. Air Force, was only retained in 
flight training during this period because his final check pilot wanted to give him a rare 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 454. 
16 Ibid. 455. 
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“second chance.”17  Although the first class in Jouett’s academy was touted as “the elite 
of China,” the fact that over fifty percent of the class washed out prior to graduation 
demonstrated the mismatch between American instructors with no Chinese language 
skills and Chinese cadets with no flying experience.  Jouett belatedly realized the 
magnitude of this problem and tried to retain nine of the most competent graduates as 
“first assignment” instructor pilots (a practice, ironically, that the modern U.S. Air Force 
re-adopts every ten to fifteen years whenever it has a pilot shortage.)18  In hindsight, the 
Jouett group would have enjoyed more long-term success if they had organized the 
Hangzhou Academy as an instructor pilot program that could “train-the-trainer” and 
produce high-quality instructors that would teach flying in a language and cultural setting 
that new trainees could understand.   
Jouett would also find his training group stymied by cultural issues that were 
unknown in a stateside military setting.  The Chinese cadets that were being sent to 
Hangzhou for training were often diagnosed with diseases and conditions that prevented 
them from flying.  According to one author with a medical background, “[Jouett’s 
school] suffered serious manpower losses due to injuries compounded by incompetent 
medical care.  In that primitive and unsanitary environment, seemingly insignificant 
wounds could become terribly infected.  Jouett had to be circumspect in his comments 
about the incompetence of local doctors, as this would cause immense political 
problems.”19  An Army Air Forces historical study conducted in 1947 would find similar 
                                                          
17 Martha Byrd.  Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger (Tuscaloosa, AL:  University of Alabama Press, 
1987.)  20-21. 
18 Leary, 455-456. 
19 Robert E. Van Patten.  “Before the Flying Tigers.”  Air Force Magazine, Vol. 82, No. 6 (June 1999.)  22-
23. 
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issues among Chinese cadets that were trained in the continental U.S. during World War 
II: 
Chinese students were frequently victims of tuberculosis, syphilis, and 
intestinal parasites.  Because of the high incidence of these diseases, a 
conference…recommended that more care be taken in the original selection of 
students.  For those already in the United States, it recommended that ‘the 
decontamination of intestinal parasites…be an automatic process by treating all 
personnel reporting for training as ambulatory patients for a period of 48 hours 
immediately upon arrival.’  It also recommended that all Chinese [students] 
suffering from syphilis be given the seven-day hospitalization syphilis treatment 
instead of being subject to elimination as formerly if they were enlisted men.20  
 
Jouett and his instructors had brought a flight surgeon from the United States, but even 
that precaution was of limited utility when large numbers of the Chinese cadets would be 
considered too sick to fly by American standards.  Another cultural factor that would 
hinder Jouett and all other American flight instructors in China was the extreme 
deference shown by Chinese students to anyone acting as a teacher or instructor.  
Grounded in Confucian tradition, this deference led many Chinese flying students to nod 
and agree with an American instructor, even if they had little comprehension of what they 
had just been told.  While this tendency was, at worst, frustrating to American instructors 
on the ground, it could have deadly consequences in the air.  U.S. authorities repeatedly 
warned Army Air Corps instructors during World War II about this aspect of training 
Chinese students and one training command even directed its instructors “never to ask the 
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Chinese [students], “Do you understand?”  Rather, the instructor was to require the 
Chinese student to explain in turn what had just been explained to him.”21 
 Despite the organizational and cultural obstacles presented by their Chinese 
environment, the Jouett training group did achieve some notable successes by 
establishing an operating flight school and graduating over 300 qualified pilots22.  
Unfortunately, it was this very success that helped insure that the Nanjing government 
would not renew the contract in 1935.  Jiang Jieshi had grown suspicious of T.V. Soong’s 
control over the aviation school and the resultant production of qualified Chinese aviators 
and mechanics.  Like other warlords in China, Jiang Jieshi preferred to use a variety of 
foreign advisors so that no single nationality would have too much influence over his 
military forces.  The Nationalist leader had also asked Jouett and his instructors to 
conduct combat operations against the Chinese Communists in 1933, a request that Jouett 
was forced to turn down due to a U.S. State Departments threat to strip any American 
who flew combat missions in China of his American citizenship.  Finally, H.H. Kung, the 
top rival for T.V. Soong’s position as Minister of Finance, had developed close ties with 
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.  When Soong fell out of favor with Jiang Jieshi in 1933, 
Kung was quick to offer the Italians as replacement advisors for the Americans.23  This 
potent mixture of Chinese politics and rival financial arrangements overshadowed the 
impressive accomplishments of Colonel Jouett and his staff.  On June 7, 1935, the 
training group sailed backed to the United States while their aviation academy was 
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moved to Luoyang, renamed the Central Aviation School and turned over to advisors 
from the Italian Air Force.   
 The departure of the Jouett mission was not the end of American aviation in 
China.  Thanks to the contacts made by Jouett and his instructors, the Chinese 
Nationalists would still employ a small number of American advisors after 1935.  
However, over the next two years, private aviation companies would be the only source 
of American influence on the development of Nationalist airpower.  With the increasing 
severity of the Great Depression and the growing political pressure from Japan, American 
politicians felt that any sort of official military contact with the Nanjing government was 
simply too risky.  Jouett and his advisors had established a military aviation school based 
on Western organizational standards, but the Chinese Nationalist Air Force was still 
overmatched by Imperial Japanese air units and would require years of training and 
preparation before it would be capable of sustained combat operations. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  THE SOVIET UNION AND THE “AVIATION REVOLUTION” 
 
 
 From the beginning, the Soviet Union was an “air-minded” nation.24  The 
Bolshevik leaders of the new Soviet state viewed aviation as an appropriately 
revolutionary form of technology that was ideally suited for a country that was 
geographically immense and lacking in transportation infrastructure.  These leaders 
would quickly take advantage of the symbolism that was inherent in airpower and use 
this symbolism in a variety of ways.  According to historian Scott Palmer, “they [the 
Bolsheviks] saw aviation both as a sign of the future and as an instrument for collectively 
liberating the nation from the constraints of its past.  More than a mere symbolic 
representation of sought-after modernity, the airplane was also seen as a means to that 
end, the mastery of which would make possible backward Russia’s rapid transformation 
into the world’s most advanced and powerful nation.”25  The development of a robust 
Soviet air service would also help solve a dilemma that faced the military commanders of 
the Soviet Union.  According to Air Commodore E. S. Williams: 
Armies were the brutal expression of the forces oppressing the proletariat in the 
pre-Revolutionary era and could only be considered anachronistic in the new 
society.  Air forces were perhaps something different.  A powerful air force acting 
as a deterrent, threatening massive retaliation to any remaining capitalist forces 
foolish enough to attack the Soviet Union, would reduce and eventually eliminate 
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the need for old-fashioned field armies.  Under this concept, long before the 
nuclear age and formalized strategies of deterrence, Soviet aviation came to be 
regarded as the popular guardian of the Revolution with a ‘world air police’ 
function…26 
By offering a wide range of practical and idealistic advantages, aviation in post-
Revolutionary Russia served both ideological and real-world strategic purposes and 
offered the Bolshevik leadership of the Soviet Union a visible symbol for their dedication 
to modern technology and commitment to constant progress towards a future utopia. 
 With this early dedication to the development of a modern aviation capability, the 
Soviet Union made air transportation one of the primary goals of its rapid 
industrialization in the 1930s.  While Soviet industry produced fewer than 3,000 domestic 
aircraft between 1918 and 1928, more than 45,000 aircraft rolled out of Soviet factories 
between 1929 and 1939.27  It was also during this period of rapid industrialization that 
Soviet aircraft design began to catch up to Western standards as modern I-15 and I-16 
fighters, as well as SB-2 and TB-3 “fast” bombers (all aircraft that would later be used by 
Soviet and Chinese aviators in the Sino-Japanese War) were produced in large numbers.  
The post-WWI emigration of talented aeronautical engineers—such as Igor Sikorsky and 
Alexander de Seversky—had hurt early Soviet development plans.  However, the next 
generation of Soviet designers—including Andrei Tupolev, Artem Mikoyan, Alexander 
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Yakovlev and Sergey Ilyushin—were just as innovative and productive as their western 
counterparts.  The Soviet Union would also follow in the footsteps of American aviators 
such as Charles Lindbergh and Amelia Earhart by pursuing world records in altitude, 
speed and endurance in an effort to showcase the modernity of Soviet aviation.  
According to Higham and Kipp, Soviet aviators such as V.K. Kokkinaki, A.B. Yumashev 
and M.A. Niukhtikov had together established ten altitude records by 1936.  One year 
later, a trio of Russian aviators flew a Tupolev ANT-25 low-wing monoplane from 
Moscow to Portland, Oregon via the polar route in June 1937.  Finally, in 1938, a three-
woman crew flew a Tupolev ANT-37 (named Rodina or “The Motherland”) almost six 
thousand kilometers in twenty-six hours, twenty-nine minutes to establish a world record 
for female aviators.  This mania for world records and international attention “resembled 
the later arduous Soviet approach to the Olympic Games.”28 
Soviet aviation during this early period would also be influenced by a particular 
strain of “gigantomania” that would afflict Soviet industry and agriculture in the 1930s 
and beyond.  According to the samizdat (self-published due to censorship) memoirs of 
Soviet aviation designer Leonid Kerber: 
The regime’s mania for large, highly visible projects influenced Soviet aviation as 
it did other sectors of industry.  Kerber makes reference to the Tupolev-designed 
Maksim Gorkiy, an eight-engine behemoth that made a dramatic flyby over Red 
Square.  This red-winged aircraft became the ultimate expression of 
“gigantomania” with its unprecedented power and range…On board was a 
printing press, photo lab, and cinema.  The aircraft operated with a crew of 20 
and, depending upon the interior configuration, could transport 43 to 76 
                                                          
28 Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp (editors), Soviet Aviation and Air Power:  A Historical View (Boulder, 
CO:  Westview Press, 1977.), 54.   
27 
 
passengers.  Such aerial spectaculars gave the regime recognition abroad and 
legitimacy at home.29 
This Soviet obsession with size would unfortunately divert Soviet designers and 
manufacturers into ideologically-driven projects that produced little in terms of tangible 
military assets.  Aircraft designers such as Andrei Tupolev would focus on increasingly 
larger versions of two- and four-engine bombers that would eventually prove only 
marginally effective in both the Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War at the end 
of the 1930s.30   
 With the production of increasingly massive numbers of airframes, Soviet training 
systems were also bolstered by the central government.  By the late 1920s, several 
booster organizations, such as the Society of Friends of the Air Fleet (ODVF) and the 
Society of Friends of Chemical Defense had been combined into the Society of Friends of 
Defense and the Aviation-Chemical Industry of the USSR (Osoaviakhim.)  Although 
these “voluntary societies” were celebrated as the end result of public spontaneity, these 
Soviet aviation versions of the Navy League were anything but grassroots in their origin.  
According to Palmer, “the establishment of ODVF and the newspaper campaign that 
preceded it were, in fact, the products of a planned, systematic, and centralized 
strategy.”31  The central place given to Soviet aviation was later emphasized when the 
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Ninth Komsomol (Young Communist League) Congress declared their formal patronage 
of the air forces.  With the rallying cry “Komsomolets—na samolet!” (Komsomol 
member—to an airplane!), the Komsomol Congress established a goal of 150,000 pilots 
for the service schools and aero clubs that represented the military and civil aviation 
infrastructure of the Soviet Union.  Finally, the August 1935 party-government decree 
“On Osoaviakhim” would demand the expansion of all aspects of military aviation and 
firmly establish the growth of the Soviet air forces as an official goal of the Communist 
Party and the Soviet government.32   
It was during this expansion of Soviet aviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
that the first large groups of Chinese aviators, such as future Chinese general P.T. Mao, 
would receive their training at Soviet flight schools just outside Moscow.33  Even at this 
early juncture, the leaders of the Soviet Union were exploring the foreign policy 
implications of flight training for foreign nationals and making the first tentative 
connections between aviation and diplomacy in the pursuit of Soviet geopolitical 
interests.34  As part of their early advisory effort in China, almost 1,000 advisors under 
the command of General Victor Rogachev helped train Chinese aviators at a flying 
school in Canton in 1925, and a small number of Soviet aviators would provide air 
support for Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalist troops during their Northern Expedition against 
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Manchurian warlords. 35  Stalin would also order Mao’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
to subordinate itself to Jiang Jieshi’s Guomindang in order to provide some form of 
organized resistance against Japanese expansion in East Asia.  According to military 
historian Mark O’Neill, “this action not only set a precedent for Stalin’s use of air power 
as a foreign policy tool, but also his overall pattern of subordinating the success of local 
Communist parties to the security concerns of the Soviet Union.”36   
 Soviet aviation advisors would continue to exert a strong influence on Chinese 
Nationalist aviation between 1925 and 1928.  However, this Soviet effort was not the first 
introduction of foreign training and equipment for the development of a Chinese air 
capability.  Before the arrival of Soviet advisors, the Guomindang had initially preferred 
American equipment and training.  Under the authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a mission of 
Chinese officers was sent to the United States in 1916.  This initial cadre, led by an 
aviator named Yang Hsien-I, would eventually create a small force of thirty aircraft by 
1923.37  This force would have a short lifespan, however.  During military operations that 
same year, a mysterious explosion at the Canton Air Force headquarters killed all the top 
aviation leaders.  Even more damaging, Dr. Sun’s foreign secretary, Eugene Chen, was 
appointed director of aviation in order to stop “the enormous leakage of funds caused by 
the dishonesty of the air service personnel.”38  These setbacks removed any chances of 
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Chinese military aviation growing beyond this initial force in the early 1920s.  After 
these disastrous developments, Chinese Nationalist authorities decided to reach out to the 
Soviet Union for aviation assistance.  According to one Soviet document, it was during 
the army reorganization of 1925 that the Political Bureau of the Guomindang (Chinese 
Nationalist Party) confirmed the need for an air service equipped and trained along 
Western lines.  Consequently, half a million dollars were budgeted for an expanded 
Chinese Nationalist air force and a commission was sent to the USSR “in order to 
establish contact and to find out whether there was a possibility of getting support to 
purchase new machines and to train personnel.”39  The Guomindang council also ordered 
the creation of a “Friends of Aviation” Society in an attempt to harness the same kind of 
popular enthusiasm for state aviation initiatives that the ODVF and Osoaviakhim had 
inspired inside the Soviet Union.40  The arrival of Soviet-trained pilots would eventually 
lead to the creation of a combined Russian/Chinese squadron with a Russian commander 
and what a Soviet report referred to as “six De Havilland’s.”41  This emphasis on a 
Soviet-led effort as opposed to a British or American effort was endorsed by the 
Guomindang leadership.  In one letter written to a Soviet general officer named Galen 
Bliukher, Jiang Jieshi stated that “it is therefore necessary to establish within the Military 
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Council a special affairs department or a national defense committee, to which a large 
number of Russian advisors should be appointed.”42 
Soviet leaders had hoped that their influence in the 1920s would eventually result 
in the Guomindang becoming a socialist organization modeled on the ruling party in 
Moscow.  Part of this plan had rested upon the hopes that seeing first-hand the advanced 
state of Soviet military aviation would convince the leaders of the Chinese Nationalists of 
the modern and progressive nature of a Marxist-Leninist politico-economic system.  
Unfortunately, as much as Jiang Jieshi admired the hierarchy and structure of the Soviet 
system, he was not prepared in the late 1920s to collectivize Chinese industry or adhere 
to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.  Jiang Jieshi subsequently expelled all Soviet political 
advisors in 1928 and sent official invitations to European and American companies to 
provide aviation training for the Chinese Nationalist air force.   
 For the Soviet government, providing aviation assistance to the Guomindang 
advanced several different interests.  First, the Soviet Union viewed aviation as a 
technological field that was perfectly matched with the progressive, utopian orientation of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.  By providing the new capabilities inherent in aviation to the 
Guomindang’s National Revolutionary Army, Soviet authorities hoped to demonstrate 
the superiority of Soviet doctrine and its commitment to progress.  Second, the 
establishment of Soviet aviation schools and the assignment of aviation advisors gave the 
Soviet government access to the National Revolutionary Army.  This access provided 
Soviet leaders an accurate assessment of Chinese tactics and capabilities that it would 
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otherwise not possess.  Soviet advisors would also act as passive intelligence collectors 
who would send regular reports through the Soviet consulates and the embassy in 
Nanjing.  Third, the existence of limited but persistent warfare between Chinese warlords 
gave Soviet advisors the chance to acquire the extremely valuable combat experience that 
was essential for the development of an effective air force.   Finally, Soviet aviation 
assistance would strengthen the ability of the Chinese Nationalists to resist Japanese 
influence and possibly prevent the Japanese from making any permanent military 
conquests on the Chinese mainland.  This last interest would become especially important 
after 1931 and would ultimately drive Soviet policy towards Jiang Jieshi’s government 
following the renewal of overt Japanese military operations against China in 1937.  With 
the National Revolutionary Army possessing the only military forces organized and 
equipped in a modern sense, including an aviation corps, Stalin felt that the Soviet Union 
must continue to favor the Guomindang over the Chinese Communists if Japanese 
ambitions on the Chinese mainland were to be effectively opposed.43   
 These early Soviet aviation programs in China would have an unintended effect 
that would exert a strong influence on air operations against the Japanese in the late 
1930s.  During the 1920s, China was afflicted with a large—and difficult to control—
group of warlords.  These warlords, including the future Generalissimo of the 
Guomindang, Jiang Jieshi, were constantly striving to demonstrate their power and 
legitimacy in hopes of attracting domestic followers as well as foreign support.  One way 
for these various leaders to showcase their power and influence was the possession of 
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Western military aircraft, as well as the hiring of Western experts to help fly and maintain 
these technologically advanced machines.  Paradoxically, these aircraft were much more 
valuable as symbols than as actual instruments of war.  According to historian Edward 
Dreyer, “Airplanes…were military exotica, prestige items cherished to the point of 
fetishism by the warlords who had them, but too rare to have decisive importance in 
battle.”44  As a consequence, Chinese military commanders became hesitant to risk these 
valuable assets in even relatively benign training missions—training missions that, no 
matter how routine, could result in destroyed aircraft and lost personnel.  Aircraft that 
were not flown regularly would theoretically not require large amounts of spare parts, 
overhauls, corrosion control, or any of the myriad support systems required to produce 
reliable and effective air operations.  The Chinese warlords were not unusual in this 
tendency to prefer an impressive-looking air force as opposed to a smaller, but more 
effective, air component.  For example, the British Royal Air Force would fall victim to 
this syndrome during the early 1930s when they attempted to deter a newly aggressive 
Germany with a large and impressive-looking bomber force.  However, the establishment 
of piecemeal regional aviation units and the desire to preserve a prestige-enhancing air 
force by each Chinese warlord would hamper all attempts by Soviet advisors to establish 
a truly effective and modernized air service for the Guomindang in the 1920s.  Without 
the presence of a large, officially sanctioned Soviet advisory group to exert a correcting 
influence, Chinese aviation would become increasingly committed to scattered fleets of 
mixed foreign airframes that possessed very little actual capability. 
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 Despite the absence of official Soviet advisory groups between 1928 and 1937, 
small numbers of Soviet aviation personnel would continue to provide maintenance and 
fabrication support to various air units across China.  Most of these personnel were 
Russian expatriates who had either stayed behind after the departure of official 
delegations or single individuals who were hired directly by the Chinese military 
commanders attempting to maintain their private air units.  Without the existence of 
domestic aircraft factories and aviation schools, any warlord trying to maintain a 
minimally effective air force needed foreign specialists to maintain and operate these 
small fleets.  Due to the common border between the Soviet Union and northern China, 
individual personnel from the Soviet Union were relatively easy to recruit, although most 
of the aircraft purchased after 1928 were shipped from Great Britain, France, Germany, 
or the United States.45  Much like their American and European counterparts, these 
Soviet citizens were employees of the various Chinese warlords they were providing 
services for, not their native government.  The presence of these Soviet citizens, along 
with the small number of American and European advisors and technical personnel that 
were employed by Jiang Jieshi and other Chinese leaders, allowed the different factions 
to maintain and operate an increasingly large number of Western-built aircraft in the 
skies of China. 
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 The Soviet Union would undergo some important changes with regards to 
industrialization, culture and aviation theory prior to the return of official Soviet support 
to Nationalist China in 1937.  Thanks to the symbolism inherent in aircraft, aviation 
advocates inside the Soviet Union were able to garner critical support from the highest 
echelons of the Communist Party.  As mentioned above, Soviet aviation made impressive 
gains during the First and Second Five-Year Plans.  According to Robin Higham and 
Jacob Kipp, “the output of aircraft during the period of the First Five-Year Plan increased 
remarkably.  The average yearly output in the years 1930 and 1931 was 860 machines; 
this increased to an average of 2,595 in the years between 1932 and 1934.”46  By 1932, 
Soviet production had reached the point that the eclectic mix of obsolete foreign planes 
could be fully replaced by aircraft designed and produced inside the Soviet Union.  
However, this surge in capacity did come at a price.  In any type of industrial production, 
quality must be sacrificed for an increase in quantity.  The quality of Soviet aircraft did 
not keep pace with the large quantities rolling off the assembly-lines.  Due to a variety of 
factors, such as the use of “storming” techniques to push production, as well as the 
overall poor quality-control that was exercised by aircraft manufactures, Soviet aviation 
would fall victim to the stereotypical “mass over quality” condition that would 
characterize Soviet military equipment for the next century.   
Along with this rise in industrial capacity, the Soviet Union would see a shift in 
both the upper and lower realms of what could be labeled “mechanical culture.”  
Following the lead of pioneers such as the Ukrainian-born engineer Igor Sikorsky—
designer of the world’s first four-engine bomber and the father of the modern 
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helicopter—the Soviet Union encouraged the ideas and theories of talented aircraft 
designers such as Andrei Tupolev, Nikolai Polikarpov, Sergi Ilyushin and Mikhail Mil.47  
These men would create the aircraft that would come to define Soviet aviation for the 
next fifty years, including the I-15 pursuit planes and SB-2 bombers that would be 
employed by the Nationalist Chinese Air Force in the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Even 
more importantly, however, the Soviet Union would also develop the sort of “back-yard 
mechanics” that would become the backbone of future Soviet aviation maintenance.  
According to Higham and Kipp: 
…the ongoing mechanization of agriculture as a result of collectivization was 
providing a reserve of potential mechanical literates, as peasants learned from 
tinkering with and operating tractors and trucks.  In addition, the Society for the 
Promotion of Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Warfare (Osoaviakhim), a 
voluntary organization dedicated to training young people in skills needed by the 
armed forces, taught tens of thousands of youth how to operate, maintain, and 
repair engines, radios and motor vehicles.  Osoaviakhim also saw to it that the 
young enthusiasts learned how to shoot straight, and even had its own aircraft in 
which future pilots could learn the rudiments of flying.  In spite of this outside 
help, the VVS [Red Air Force] was forced to become one great technical training 
institution, with academies and flying schools mushrooming all over the 
country.48 
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This rise of a mechanically-minded lower class would mirror the cultural-shift that had 
been experienced in the United States with the growing use of tractors and automobiles in 
the 1920s and 1930s.  This effort to train and educate the future mechanics and specialists 
needed for a large air force was reflected in the statistics provided for this era.  While the 
number of active-duty officers classified as “General Aviation” and “Pilots” grew by 
roughly 250% between 1934 and 1939, the number of “Aviation technicians” grew by an 
astounding 900%.49  Therefore, as important as the production of domestic Soviet 
military airframes was to the growth of a modern Soviet air service, it was the creation of 
a “mechanical culture” and the concomitant rise in trained, mechanically-savvy personnel 
that allowed the creation of modern air service inside the Red Army during the 1930s.   
Finally, Soviet airpower doctrine would drastically change between 1931 and 
1937.  One of the major changes would be a shift from bomber-centric to pursuit-centric 
operations.  Part of this shift was driven by technology.  As engines became more 
powerful and aircraft designs more efficient, pursuit aircraft began to catch up to bombers 
in terms of overall speed.  The armaments of pursuit aircraft also began to present a real 
threat to larger aircraft as well.  The I-15 and I-16 pursuit aircraft that would be used to 
such noticeable effect in the Spanish Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War would 
carry either four 7.62mm machine guns (I-15) or two 7.62mm machine guns and two 20 
mm cannons (I-16.)50  The main reason that the Soviet Union began to emphasize pursuit 
operations, however, was the disappointing performance of early bombers against pursuit 
aircraft in actual combat operations.  It wasn’t until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War 
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and the involvement of Soviet aircrews in that conflict that the airpower theories built 
around bombers would lose some of their legitimacy in the eyes of Soviet strategists.   
Until that point, almost every airpower strategist around the world was 
convinced—and had convinced the leaders of every major power—that bomber 
operations were the future of military airpower and that the destruction of enemy 
population centers and industrial complexes would be the hallmark of any future conflict.  
Early airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet in Italy, Billy Mitchell in the United 
States, and Hugh Trenchard in Great Britain emphasized the speed, range and devastating 
effect that massed formations of bombers would have on enemy naval forces (Mitchell), 
civilian population centers (Douhet), or industrial sectors (Trenchard).  According to 
Douhet, “to have command of the air means to be in a position to wield offensive power 
so great it defies human imagination.  It means to be able to cut an enemy’s army and 
navy off from their bases of operation and nullify their chances of winning the war.  It 
means complete protection of one’s own country…”51  Douhet was merely echoing the 
assumptions of aviators across the globe when he predicted that the next “world war” 
would start with the massive bombardment of civilian population centers.52  Since 
bomber aircraft in the 1920s were faster than pursuit planes and flew at higher altitudes, 
airpower enthusiasts assumed that the only possible defense for threatened nations was 
the establishment of a strong deterrent—usually in the form of an modern bomber force. 
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This emphasis on defense of the homeland would receive even greater publicity from 
Billy Mitchell.  While Douhet and Trenchard would only become well-known in the 
decades following the Second World War, Mitchell and his theories of airpower would 
become widely known during the public battles between Mitchell and the U.S. Navy.  
Later, when Mitchell was court-martialed for his remarks, his views would be enhanced 
by the aura of martyrdom that became attached to his name.  For a nation-state with a 
history of foreign invasions such as the Soviet Union, the benefits of a robust bomber 
force would be hard to miss.  In the eyes of a Soviet leader such as Stalin, a bomber-
centric air service would seem the perfect deterrent to a future attack from the periphery 
of the Soviet Union. 
These assumptions about the effectiveness of bomber operations would be 
severely tested during the Spanish Civil War and would ultimately influence Soviet 
operations in China.  Between 1936 and 1938, the Soviet Union shipped approximately 
eight hundred aircraft to Spain, mostly first-line airframes such as the I-15 and I-16 
pursuit planes.  The Soviets also deployed over 3,000 aviation personnel, including 772 
pilots.53  Much like the later fighter-centric effort over China, this substantial contribution 
of Soviet airpower would allow the Spanish Loyalists to establish a state of air superiority 
over Spain that would last until mid-1937.  Most importantly, however, the Soviets would 
test their airpower doctrines in Spain and come to some conclusions about modern air 
warfare that differed from the theories of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell.  These 
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revised theories on airpower and the roles of fighters and bombers would have a direct 
impact on Soviet operations in China following the resumption of open warfare in 1937.  
Initially, the Soviets became convinced that defensive pursuit operations were 
vital to the protection of friendly aerodromes.  Because of the relatively small size of the 
Spanish area of operations, aerodromes had to be located fairly close to the front lines.  
One Soviet reported stated that “it goes without saying that the defender will have to 
develop an aerodrome system in such areas and to maintain enough fuel, bombs, and 
ammunition at these aerodromes for the first two or three flights.”54  Therefore, Soviet 
aircrews and mechanics were directed to operate from a high-alert status, the same high-
alert status that would later make such an impression on Claire Chennault in China.  
These alert operations are described in one intelligence brief provided by the U.S. Army 
Air Corps in 1938: 
“In the Madrid area, where the time between the reporting of an approaching air 
raid and its arrival is extremely short, a quick take-off is absolutely necessary.  
The Russians accomplish this by selecting the airplanes scheduled for the alert 
mission from those dispersed on the emergency aerodrome and heading them into 
the wind.  The pilot dressed in flying clothing, with parachute on and safety belt 
fastened, is seated in the airplane, ready for the signal.  Two mechanics are 
continuously by the side of each airplane and two or three relief pilots are nearby 
to replace, when necessary, pilots scheduled to go.  Only one pilot can leave his 
plane at a time.  The majority of pilots are reported to do the minor 
maintenance.”55 
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This penchant for alert launches in the Spanish Civil War would also lead Soviet aviators 
to develop a very unusual technique for getting the maximum number of fighter aircraft 
in the air in the shortest possible time.  Later described by foreign observers in China 
during the Sino-Japanese War, this Soviet tactic consisted of parking their pursuit aircraft 
at the edges of the circular aerodrome, all pointed towards the center.  When the air raid 
siren sounded, all of the Soviet pilots would start their aircraft and take-off more-or-less 
simultaneously towards the center of the aerodrome.  This unorthodox approach resulted 
in a large number of pursuit aircraft getting airborne without the delay of lining up in 
sequence for take-off.  However, this chaotic launch of multiple aircraft towards each 
other invariably resulted in mid-air collisions.  According to Claire Chennault, “I never 
saw a Russian scramble that failed to produce at least one collision.  On several 
occasions, I elected to take my chances against enemy bombs on the ground rather than 
participate in one of those wild scrambles.”56  This “wild scramble” was also a direct 
reflection of the Soviet attitude towards men and equipment in that it demonstrated the 
Soviet lack of concern over short-term losses.  Soviet air commanders in Spain, China 
and the eastern regions of the Soviet Union assumed that any losses caused by poor 
maintenance, inexperienced pilots or risky tactics such as the Russian “mad scramble” 
would be more than compensated for by the prodigious amounts of men and material 
possessed by the Soviet Union.  Thus, while Soviet airmen in Spain realized the 
importance of defensive fighter operations and the need for secure aerodromes and 
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airfields, they also adopted a negligent attitude towards aircraft and pilot attrition that 
would have a negative impact on later advisory operations in China. 
During the Spanish Civil War, the Soviets also believed that a liaison officer—
preferably the aviation commander—should be stationed at the “advanced observation 
post of the senior military commander, and, in accordance with the requirements of the 
situation…should call out any additional aircraft units from the ground.”57  Even more 
importantly with regards to future advisory operations, this air-ground coordination “may 
best be accomplished by radio, and the airfields of the pursuit aviation should accordingly 
have radio facilities.58  This close coordination between air and ground elements, as well 
as the stationing of a senior air officer at an advanced observation post, was diametrically 
opposed to the “centralized control, centralized command” approach that American and 
British airmen were advocating for their respective air services.  During a time of 
increasingly vocal demands for an independent air force in the United States, Soviet air 
commanders in Spain were becoming increasingly convinced of the need to closely 
coordinate air activities with ground force commanders in order to fully support any 
ground offensive in the most effective way possible. 
The Soviets became convinced that strategic bombing operations were risky and 
ultimately ineffective in terms of their intended effect, especially when these bombing 
raids targeted the morale of civilian population centers.  While the bombing of Spanish 
cities received international attention—especially the bombing of Guernica by Nationalist 
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bombers—Soviet aviators and their leadership saw very little gain from the enormous 
amounts of manpower and material that were required for a large bomber offensive.  
Bomber aircraft were more complex than pursuit aircraft and demand significantly more 
maintenance and depot repair.  Bomber crews also consisted of at least two pilots, a 
bombardier, a navigator and whatever aerial gunners were needed for self-defense.  
Pursuit aircraft, on the other hand, were single-engine, single-pilot machines that could 
be produced and shipped in large numbers and required relatively moderate amounts of 
maintenance.  Even if bomber operations had not been inherently more complex and 
time-consuming than fighter operations, there was little proof that the bombing of civilian 
population centers were effective in any measurable way.  One Soviet after-action report 
claimed that Nationalist bombing raids had little effect on civilian morale.  According to 
this report, “where the army and civilian inhabitants know the reasons why the way is 
being fought, they will readily endure all hardships, no matter how powerful the effect of 
the hostile aircraft may be.  A good example of this is afforded by the people and 
defenders of Madrid.”59  Furthermore, bombing formations in the late 1930s were clearly 
out-matched by front-line pursuit aircraft.  According to one Soviet report, the number of 
escort pursuit planes must be double the number of bombing aircraft.  Newer anti-aircraft 
guns also proved to be a deadly threat to bomber formations that flew at anything other 
than high altitude (twenty thousand feet and higher.)  This observation, like the Soviet 
experience with command and control, would run counter to the airpower theories that 
were being taught in the RAF and the U.S. Army Air Corps.  As one French report 
summed up the “lessons learned” from the air war over Spain, “On the whole, the 
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Spanish war lends little color to the idea that ‘the bomber will always get through.’  It 
should encourage us in our measures of defense.”60 
Finally, the Soviet experience in Spain would convince Red Air Force pilots and 
planners that the establishment and maintenance of air superiority with a large fleet of 
fighter aircraft was absolutely vital for the conduct of both air and ground operations 
against a similarly armed foe.  Unlike the vast majority of other modern military forces, 
the Russian volunteers in Spain had experienced first-hand the vulnerability of ground 
units to modern attack aircraft.  Attacks from the air could stop even successful infantry 
advances, and friendly ground formations seemed to be bolstered by the presence of 
supporting aircraft directly over their positions.  According to one Soviet observer, “as a 
result of the successful efforts of the loyalists in this connection, the insurgent bombers 
hardly ever risked attacks on any loyalist forces that were protected by pursuit aircraft.  
Moreover, the use of pursuit patrols here enhanced the morale of the troops who, feeling 
strong protection in the air, carried out their combat missions with greater assurance.”61   
The morale-boosting effect of overhead air presence would also be seen in China, where 
Nationalist Chinese ground forces would perform well under friendly air cover, but quickly fell 
apart if undefended against Japanese air attacks.  
All of these observations from the Spanish Civil War would be strengthened by, 
and therefore affected, what Soviet fighter and bomber crews would later see in China.  
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Chinese air operations were dependent upon properly constructed and supplied 
aerodromes to an even greater degree than loyalist air units in Spain.  Japanese air raids 
on Chinese cities were magnitudes worse than the German and Italian bombing 
campaigns against Madrid, Guernica and other Spanish cities but resulted in similarly 
ineffective results in terms of bringing about a collapse of civilian morale.  Most 
importantly of all, Soviet pilots and their commanders were absolutely convinced that air 
superiority must be maintained above all else in order for friendly air and ground 
operations to have any chance of success.  The final result of these “lessons learned” 
from the Spanish Civil War was a Soviet air service that had turned away from an 
emphasis on strategic bomber operations and was beginning to develop a frontline-
oriented aviation branch that was focused on air superiority and close air support with 
large formations of fighters and fighter-bombers that were designed for simplified 
maintenance and high attrition rates.  It was just such a force that Josef Stalin would send 
to the aid of Nationalist China in the autumn of 1937. 
Politically, Soviet military aviation between 1931 and 1937 received enormous 
amounts of both direct and indirect support from the Communist Party and the Soviet 
government.  Aviation was held up as the technological partner of Marxist-Leninist 
theory.  Soviet aviators were lauded both inside and outside the USSR for their 
accomplishments in the 1930s.  Stalin also possessed enough foresight to realize that 
combat experience is invaluable for a new air force and thus authorized advisory and 
assistance missions to Spain and China in the mid-1930s.  Organizationally, the Soviet air 
force initially focused on large, multi-engine bombers for a host of strategic and 
ideological reasons.  After seeing the results of bombing campaigns in Spain, the Soviets 
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started to emphasize air superiority and close air support missions in an attempt to 
maximize the effectiveness of ground operations.  Finally, the Soviet Union successfully 
created the mechanical “tinkering” culture necessary to train the large numbers of 
mechanics, radiomen and other types of support personnel that are just as vital as pilots 
for a fledgling air service.  Like most military aviation organizations around the world, 
the Soviet air force enjoyed the sorts of popularity and increased pay that made the air 
branch a desirable alternative to service with the Red Army or Soviet naval forces.   
By the mid-1930s, Soviet aviators possessed the skill and confidence necessary to 
travel across the Eurasian landmass and export the tactics, techniques and procedures that 
had produced tangible results for the Soviet air force.  However, pre-1937 Soviet aviation 
advisors in China were just as prone as their ground counterparts to underestimating the 
importance of cultural factors in advisory operations.  One Soviet general officer, A.I. 
Cherepanov, would identify two important obstacles for foreign advisors working in 
China.  First, he observed that Chinese officers and instructors were afraid of “losing 
face.”  Second, Cherepanov criticizes the early Soviet advisors for not having the 
language skills to make up for a lack of interpreters.  Both of these factors were identified 
as significant obstacles to Soviet advisory efforts in the 1920s and 1930s.  These 
oversights would have important implications for the development of Chinese military 
aviation in the Second Sino-Japanese War.62 
Without the forced industrialization contained in the First and Second Five-Year 
Plans; the development of aviation booster clubs such as the OVDF; and the combat 
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experience gained in the Spanish Civil War, it is doubtful that Soviet air power could 
have developed the culture and infrastructure necessary for effective advisory operations 
in China.  Of all the factors that played a role in the building of Soviet airpower, the 
“mechanical” culture was the most important.  Airpower was—and still is—completely 
dependent upon the employment of personnel comfortable with advanced technology and 
mechanization.  Therefore, the true challenge for Soviet aviators and mechanics was not 
direct combat operations against the Japanese.  Rather, the challenge would be creating a 
culture-based effort in order to foster the growth and development that the Soviet system 
had experienced.  This would be especially difficult in a China that was even less 
mechanized and technologically oriented than the Soviet Union had been at the end of the 
1920s. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  U.S. AND SOVIET AVIATION IN CHINA, 1937-1940 
 
 After the departure of the John Jouett and his team of advisors in 1935, the 
Nationalist government continued to employ small numbers of privately-employed 
American advisors, much in the same manner that the Chinese Nationalists had continued 
to make use of individual Russian advisors after the termination of official Soviet 
advisory efforts in 1928.  With no official support from either the United States or the 
Soviet Union between 1935 and 1937, the Chinese Air Force nevertheless still engaged 
small numbers of Americans and Russians.  However, after 1935, both primary and 
advanced training was provided by formal training teams dispatched by the government 
of Italian leader Benito Mussolini.  Besides providing official military advisors, 
Mussolini also promised to establish a new flying school at Luoyang and build an Italian 
factory in China.63  This introduction of Italian advisors highlighted a long-standing feud 
between two rival Guomindang officials who both sought to control the growth and 
development of the Chinese Air Force. The office of Chinese Finance Minister was 
occupied in the 1930s by either T.V. Soong, the Harvard-educated brother-in-law of 
Jiang Jieshi, and H.H. Kung, a Chinese bureaucrat with strong connections to European 
industry.  Soong, a strong supporter of Jouett and American assistance, was replaced by 
Kung in early 1933, a move that effectively ended any chance of the United States 
remaining the primary provider of aviation training in China.  However, when the Italians 
later proved to be ineffective, Soong was made Finance Minister once again in 1937, a 
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move that quickly brought a large number of American advisors, including Claire 
Chennault, back to China.  As a result of these changes in advisory programs, it appeared 
to Chinese leaders such as Jiang Jieshi that the Guomindang would receive the benefits of 
foreign specialists without becoming overly dependent upon any one specific foreign 
power. 
 The switch from a commercial training effort to an officially designated 
governmental advisory program had a profound impact on the recently unified Chinese 
Air Force.  The difference between privately employed advisors and official foreign 
military advisors may seem merely a matter of semantics but there are important 
differences between the two types of efforts, especially in aviation, that can have a 
profound impact on the organization being trained and advised.  No private effort, no 
matter how well organized, can muster the manpower and material needed for a 
coordinated, sustained advisory effort that lasts years or even decades.  While individual 
advisors will come and go as dictated by personal business, health concerns or other 
employment opportunities, official contingents have a large pool of personnel that can be 
tapped at any time for replacements or even organized into a series of rotations.  This 
became the case with the German and Italian contingents, who rotated various military 
personnel in and out of China during the last half of the 1930s.   
Unlike privately employed instructors, official advisors were not employees of the 
host government.  Their primary mission was to carry out the foreign policies of their 
home governments, a situation that made official military advisory missions take on an 
almost diplomatic aspect.  Privately employed advisors, on the other hand, were primarily 
motivated by salary.  As paid employees of the host government, these individuals could 
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be controlled and utilized in ways that would have been problematic with an official 
mission representing a foreign government.  These privately employed advisors could 
also be hired or fired at will without the diplomatic awkwardness that would be caused by 
similar treatment toward an official contingent from a foreign power.  By using a mix of 
both official and private advisors, as well as avoiding using any one group of foreign 
advisors for too long, the Chinese Nationalists hoped to gain the maximum benefits from 
different schools and different strategic outlooks while retaining a large measure of 
independence with regards to aircraft sales and technical expertise.  Claire Chennault 
viewed this seemingly contradictory policy as a logical continuation of China’s history 
with foreign advisors:   
Paradoxically, China has always leaned strongly on foreign advisors, particularly 
technical experts.  When things go wrong, the foreigners generally offer the most 
convenient scapegoat and are easily saddled with the national woes.  I remember 
well a visit from Dr. T.V. Soong, when he was spending part of a temporary exile 
from the Chungking government in Yunnan.  His critics had forced him from the 
government on charges that he had introduced too many foreign advisors to 
China64   
However, this balancing act with different advisory programs would change drastically 
with the resumption of open hostilities against Japanese forces in 1937. 
 Since 1931 and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the probability of a full-
scale war between the Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi and the Imperial forces of 
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Japan had become increasingly likely with each passing year.  However, with the Sian 
Incident resolved in December 1936 and both Chinese Nationalists and Communists at 
least notionally committed to the idea of a “United Front” against Japanese aggression, it 
appeared that China could finally confront the Japanese forces occupying Chinese 
territory and expect some measure of success.65  On July 7, 1937, Chinese and Japanese 
ground forces exchanged gunfire in the vicinity of the Lugou bridge—commonly referred 
to as the Marco Polo Bridge—just outside the city of Beijing.  For the next month, 
Japanese forces repositioned themselves for what the Japanese government cynically 
described as “stabilization” operations, primarily aimed at securing the safety of Japanese 
citizens living in the coastal cities of China.66  Despite this heightened state of tension, 
there was no direct combat between Japanese and Chinese ground forces in the month 
following the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident.”  However, the actions of the Chinese Air 
Force would eventually escalate this state of affairs into a full-scale war. 
On August 14, 1937, a large formation of Northrop light bombers and Curtiss 
Hawk dive bombers departed from the aerodrome at Hangzhou and headed northeast 
towards Shanghai.  The mission of this Chinese task force was the destruction of the 
Japanese heavy cruiser Idzumo—the headquarters of Japanese naval forces in the area—
as well as the other Japanese cruisers anchored just off-shore in the Huangpu River.  As 
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the formation approached Shanghai, the Chinese pilots noticed that the city was covered 
with a ragged deck of clouds that would prevent any sort of high- or medium-altitude 
attack.  However, rather than cancel the mission, the Chinese formation leader pressed on 
towards the harbor.  In his autobiography Way of a Fighter, Claire Chennault, the overall 
planner for this ill-fated mission, described what happened over Shanghai that day: 
Chinese bomber crews had been carefully trained to bomb at a fixed air speed and 
an altitude of 7,500 feet.  Their orders were to avoid approaching the Idzumo over 
the International Settlement as we all recognized that there was too much tinder in 
those polyglot streets ready to flare into an international incident that would 
damage the Chinese cause.  Weather over Shanghai was bad for high-level 
bombing.  Rather than turn back in an abortive mission, the Chinese pilots went 
on down below the overcast to make their bomb runs at 1,500 feet in a shallow 
dive that boosted their air speed above their accustomed bomb run.  They violated 
orders to avoid the International Settlement and failed to adjust their bomb sights 
for the new speed and altitude.  As a result, their bombs fell short of the Idzumo 
and smacked into the busiest block of Nanking Road, the main thoroughfare.  One 
was a dud.  The other killed 950 people of various nationalities and wounded 
1,150 more.  The destruction of that single 1,100-lb bomb in the middle of a 
crowded city should have been a warning to the world, along with the earlier 
German thermite fire-bomb attack that razed Guernica in Spain.67 
The rest of the formation also dropped their bombs short of their intended targets, leaving 
the Idzumo and her sister ships unscathed.  Chennault was correct in his assessment of the 
consequences of a botched attack.  One telegram from the U.S. Consulate sent to the U.S. 
Secretary of State on August 14 stated that “repeated and increasingly heavy bombing by 
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Chinese planes is continuing.  Several bombs have dropped within area of foreign refuge 
near waterfront.  Palace Hotel hit.  Chinese planes are not respecting Settlement or area 
of refuge.”68  American instructor pilot William McDonald remarked on the “severe 
criticism everywhere on poor accuracy of Chinese bombers” and further noted that 
“People stranded here in [Palace] Hotel with families and Shanghai have offered CNAC 
pilots $250.00 a head to take them to Hong Kong.”69  Later nicknamed “Black Saturday,” 
this attempted strike on the Japanese naval forces in Shanghai was the inaugural 
operation of the Western-trained and equipped Chinese Nationalist Air Force and 
signaled the true beginning of a long and bloody struggle between the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Navy and the Chinese Nationalist forces under Jiang Jieshi. 
 The disastrous actions of the Chinese Air Force on August 14 revealed to the 
world what only a few people had known up that point:  The Chinese Nationalist Air 
Force was a hollow shell.  A former instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School at 
Maxwell Field, Alabama, Claire Chennault was originally hired by Jiang Jieshi and his 
wife, Soong May-Ling, to provide an accurate and impartial assessment of the true status 
of the Guomindang’s air service.70  What Chennault found in July 1937 was an air force 
of almost six hundred aircraft that could produce less than one hundred combat-ready 
bombers and fighters.  This force was a hodge-podge collection of mostly obsolete 
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French, Italian, German, British and American aircraft, with all of the planes carried on 
the books as potential wartime assets.71  Chennault also described the Chinese primary 
flight school at Luoyang as having a one hundred percent graduation rate under the 
Italian flight instructors that had replaced John Jouett and his American team in 1934.72  
In Chennault’s opinion, the Italians had deliberately sabotaged the Chinese Air Force, 
although there was no direct proof that the Italians were guilty of anything besides gross 
incompetence and acquiescing to the Chinese habit of hiding bad news from their 
superiors.  Another American advisor noted in his diary that the Chinese leadership was 
not listening to Chennault and that “it looks like the Japanese will only have to give these 
men a little rope and they will bring a sudden end to their own Air Force.  Now they are 
afraid to attack in the daytime and cannot at night, so it looks bad – day and night – when 
else could they fly?”73  By all indications, it appeared that the Chinese Air Force was an 
ill-prepared organization for the battles that lay ahead. 
    Although Chennault and other American advisors concentrated their efforts on the 
numbers of pilots and the aircraft in his assessment, the support structures and logistical 
condition of the Chinese Air Force also provoked some alarm and concern.  One of the 
biggest problems was the lack of a domestic aircraft industry in China.  The Italians had 
established an assembly plant at Nanchang for the production of Fiat pursuit planes, but 
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Chennault dismissed the plant as a “fraud.”  American manufacturer Curtiss-Wright had 
constructed a large facility in Hangzhou for the building and repairing of Curtiss Hawk 
fighter-bombers, but advancing Japanese troops would force the Curtiss-Wright 
representative, Bill Pawley, to relocate the plant three times in the four years between the 
Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Pearl Harbor.  This lack of any significant source of 
domestic aircraft production would also introduce many opportunities for graft and 
corruption.  Pawley would become increasingly problematic for the overall American 
advisory effort when he successfully scuttled a signed contract between Seversky 
Aviation and the Guomindang in 1938 and later demanded a ten percent commission on a 
4.5 million dollar deal between Curtiss-Wright and the Chinese government in 1941.74   
Without any reliable way to build new aircraft, the Guomindang would be forced 
to import new airframes through either the eastern seaports, such as Shanghai and Hong 
Kong, or over the common border shared with the Soviet Union.  However, the Japanese 
Navy would seal off all Chinese seaports by 1939.  Without a coastal port, any American 
aircraft would have to be shipped to British or French colonial ports in either Burma, 
India, or Vietnam, assembled at an airfield and then flown over the mountains into China 
from the south.  Even if Curtiss-Wright or other American companies had succeeded in 
building plants in China, this still would have been no guarantee that a mechanically 
reliable fleet of aircraft would have been available for operations against a future 
Japanese invasion.  While heavy flight operations can obviously lead to high attrition 
rates for aircraft fleets due to higher rates of mishaps and mechanical failures, the under-
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utilization of an air force could be just as detrimental as environmental decay and 
corrosion took their toll. 
Another serious issue was the lack of aerodromes and emergency landing fields.  
According to Chennault, “all airfields were turf surfaced, most of them merely cleared 
and leveled meadows with dusty dirt strips for runways.  These fields were dusty in dry 
weather, quagmires when it rained, and hardly suitable for use by heavy bombers.”75  
Once the Japanese Navy started launching air raids against Chinese airfields in Shanghai, 
Hangzhou and other major aviation centers, the Chinese Air Force were forced to re-
locate their dwindling air assets further and further from the front lines.  One lecturer in 
the United States described how “the operations of the Japanese most seriously crippled 
the Chinese air force, not so much by actual shooting down of planes or bombing of 
planes on the ground, but by driving them away from their established bases and forcing 
them to operate from inadequately prepared fields, lacking maintenance facilities and 
personnel.”76  The lack of emergency landing fields located close to the front lines also 
made it almost impossible for the Chinese to recover any heavily damaged aircraft that 
were unable to make the 30 or 45 minute flight to a friendly aerodrome.  One of 
Chennault’s priorities was convincing the Chinese Nationalists to begin constructing 
aerodromes and landing strips across central and western China that could be used if 
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Chinese forces were pushed away from the coastal regions that contained the majority of 
Chinese aviation facilities. 
 The arrival of Chennault coincided with one apparently positive change for 
Chinese aviation.  With the rise of Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang to national 
preeminence, the scattered aviation units that had been controlled by rival warlords had 
finally been consolidated into a centralized organization that could be recognized as a 
national air service.  To give this new branch of the National Revolutionary Army an 
increased level of access to the Guomindang leadership, Soong May-Ling (commonly 
referred to in the United States as Madame Chiang Kai-Shek) was named as the head of 
the Aviation Commission just prior to the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
1937.  Raised in a Methodist household by a missionary father and educated the United 
States as a teenager and a college student, Soong May-Ling was unabashedly pro-
American and threw her considerable influence behind the American advisors providing 
training assistance to the embattled Chinese Air Force in 1937.   
Chennault in particular enjoyed a close relationship with the wife of the 
Generalissimo and tried his best to use her access to Jiang Jieshi to press for much-
needed reforms in the Chinese Air Force.  Unlike all of the Chinese military leaders that 
had rotated in and out of the leadership positions in that organization, Chennault was 
blunt and direct in his assessment of its capabilities.  On several occasions, Chennault 
invited the Chinese First Lady out to the nearest airfield in order to show her the true 
state of China’s military air branch.  According to Chennault: 
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While the Japanese were sending a hundred planes a day over Nanking, Madame 
Chiang repeatedly risked her life by coming to the airfield—always a prime 
target—to encourage the Chinese pilots, for whom she felt responsible…Early 
one morning Madame Chiang joined us to watch a night dive-bombing mission 
return from Shanghai.  She was obviously pleased when all eleven planes were 
sighted over the field.  Flying weather was perfect as they circled to land.  Her joy 
was short-lived.  The first pilot overshot and cracked up in a rice paddy.  The next 
ground-looped and burst into flame.  The third landed safely, but the fourth 
smashing into the fire truck speeding toward the burning plane.  Five out of 
eleven planes were wrecked landing and four pilots killed. 
 Madame Chiang burst into tears.  “What can we do, what can we do?” she 
sobbed.  “We buy them the best planes money can buy, spend so much time and 
money training them, and they are killing themselves before my eyes.  What can 
we do?”  She had witnessed a demonstration of some of the Italians’ prize pupils 
from the Loyang 100-percent-graduation school.77 
 
This telling anecdote revealed something that was difficult for most observers to grasp at 
the time.  Even without the presence of Japanese fighters over the cities of China, the 
attrition caused by increased operations tempo was rapidly destroying the Chinese Air 
Force.  Even if the United States or any other foreign government could have magically 
transported hundreds of brand-new aircraft to China, these assets would have either been 
quickly destroyed by Japanese fighters over the coastal regions or slowly destroyed by 
the sub-standard runways, faulty maintenance and poor flying skills that constituted 
Chinese air operations at their home aerodromes.  The dispatching of an official 
American advisory team—such as the earlier Jouett mission—may have been an effective 
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answer to this dilemma, but the United States was still following an official policy of 
isolationism in the late 1930s and even the small contributions made by Chennault and 
other American instructors made the U.S. State Department fearful of Japanese 
complaints and resulted in some American advisors returning home rather than risk a 
confrontation with Foggy Bottom.78 
 With no official support from the United States, the solution to China’s aviation 
problem seemed to lie with the Soviet Union.  On August 21, 1937, the Soviet Union and 
the Chinese Nationalists signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression, along with associated 
agreements concerning technical and military assistance.79  For Stalin and the Soviet 
Union, a Sino-Japanese War was a golden opportunity to secure the Soviet Union’s 
eastern border.  According to aviation historians Higham and Kipp, “Stalin saw much to 
be gained from helping the Chinese in their struggle, thereby keeping the Japanese busy 
enough in China to discourage any serious incursions into Soviet territory.  The main 
Soviet contribution in the Sino-Japanese War was aircraft and pilots.”80  By November 
1937, as part of “Operation Zet,” Soviet aviation advisors would begin arriving in China, 
quickly followed by flights of I-15 and I-16 fighters and small numbers of SB-2 and TB-
3 bombers.  Most of these advisors were volunteers who initially assumed that they 
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would be sent to Spain to assist Republican forces in their fight against Francisco 
Franco’s Nationalists.  Instead, these aviators were inspected by “Spanish” veterans such 
as Y.V. Smushkevich, G.N. Zakharov, and P.I. Pumpur and given secret orders to travel 
to China for direct combat operations against Japanese forces in China.81  The first 
contingent included pilots, maintainers, airfield engineers, and other specialists needed 
for sustained combat operations.  Almost 450 personnel were mustered for this initial 
deployment.  Pursuit and bomber aircraft were first shipped to Hong Kong on chartered 
British steamships, with Haiphong and Rangoon used for later shipments when Chinese 
ports were blockaded by the Imperial Japanese Navy.  Eventually, a northern supply 
route through Mongolia would be constructed to move aircraft and personnel into 
Chinese territory.82  Chinese personnel also traveled to the Soviet Union for aviation 
training and by the spring of 1938, two hundred pilots had been trained at Soviet flight 
schools and were flying missions against the Japanese in Soviet-built I-15 and I-16 
fighter aircraft.   
 Like the conflict in Spain, one of the important benefits of this advisory effort by 
Soviet aviators were the lessons learned with regards to combat operations.  It was in 
China that Soviet pilots first realized that the 7.62mm machineguns used by their pursuit 
aircraft were inadequate for dog-fighting and began replacing this armament with larger 
12.7mm guns.83  Soviet leaders also began to realize the importance of experience and by 
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the end of 1937 had forbidden any Soviet unit to depart for China if it completely lacked 
combat-experienced personnel.84  However, the most important tactical lesson that the 
Soviets learned in China was the vulnerability of bomber operations to fighter defenses.  
On both sides of the conflict, it quickly became obvious that fighter escorts had to be 
included in any bomber mission if an aerial massacre was to be prevented.  The Soviet air 
crews would fly bombing missions against Japanese targets, along with the Chinese 
aircrews that had recently been trained on Soviet fighter and bomber airframes.  These 
bombing missions were effective but costly.  According to one Soviet source, “The 
Japanese themselves understood that they still had much to learn about the art of long 
range flight, and that nothing would be discovered during peace.  However, the Chinese 
extracted a dear price for our lessons.  We discovered, almost immediately and with 
shattering clarity that bombers could not vie with enemy fighters.  We lost many aviators 
before learning this lesson.”85   
During the Sino-Japanese War, Soviet advisory personnel would also begin to 
develop a unique and decidedly short-term view of maintenance and support operations, 
especially as they related to wartime operations.  While trained pilots and up-to-date 
aircraft were an important aspect of their advisory effort, Soviet accounts from this time 
describe the austere conditions and primitive facilities that sometimes hampered 
operations: 
The landing fields with a weak soil base along the route were poorly 
suited for the SB.  Navigator P. T. Sobin reminisces that the aerodromes along the 
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route Alma-Ata-Liangzhou, as a rule, were built on the sites of old graveyards.  
There were instances when the wheels broke into the tombs.  For protection 
against mudslides from the mountains, the landing fields were surrounded by 
stone fences, but many stones generally lay on the runways.  The local population 
were mobilized for their daily removal, but all the same, the stones remained.  
Far from all of our pilots had sufficient flying experience on the relatively 
new aircraft.  Nor were the series of intervening mountain airfields, located at 
heights of 1900 meters, always taken into account.  Machines were often damaged 
landing.  Reports from the route informed  “...flew into the earthen wall and 
wiped off his undercarriage”, “...became stuck in the mud and broke a strut”, 
“...landed wide of the mark and damaged the left leg”.  Also doing its bit was the 
low quality, dirty Chinese petrol, with which the motors could not produce full 
power.  And on one occasion at Urumchi, the Chinese erroneously began to fill 
the fuel tanks with water!86 
 
It was due to the high attrition rates and poor conditions that Soviet airmen began 
adopting a culture of “disposability” that was soon transferred to their Chinese students 
and the Chinese Air Force as a whole.  When one U.S. Army officer touring Chinese 
airfields asked about Russian maintenance practices, he was informed that “regarding 
Russian equipment…the Russian airplanes were built for but a short life at the front; that 
the Russian engines would only stand a maximum of two overhauls whereas some 
American engines had been overhauled nine times and were still capable of further 
overhaul.”87  Aircraft were short-term assets that would be quickly consumed by either 
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day-to-day attrition caused by weather, landing conditions and poor flying skill or the 
inevitable toll taken by combat operations against the Japanese.  Regardless of the cause, 
Soviet and Chinese aviators began to disregard any type of long-term maintenance 
practices on the theory that it was more efficient to obtain new aircraft than to waste time 
and resources on older aircraft that would soon be lost to combat operations or non-
combat attrition.  Thousands of aircraft would be transported from the Soviet Union to 
China, for use by both Soviet units as well as units of the Chinese Air Force.  Over a 
thousand Soviet fighters and bombers would be earmarked for the Chinese Air Force, 
with most of these lost or grounded by 1941.88  The Soviet advisors, confident that any 
losses in China could be more than offset by the prodigious manufacturing capacity of 
Soviet industry, encouraged their Chinese counterparts to discard any aircraft that could 
not be easily repaired and disregard attrition rates that were consuming scores of aircraft 
a month.   
 Both the Soviet and American advisors in China viewed each other with a healthy 
dose of suspicion.  Claire Chennault correctly assessed the motives behind Soviet support 
for the Guomindang when he wrote “The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo 
solely because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing 
Japan…Japan had been preparing an attack on Russia for twenty years, and unnumbered 
shooting rehearsals had been held along the Siberian border.  The Russians were willing 
to help anybody who was fighting and weakening Japan.”89  For Stalin, it was worth the 
cost in men and material to keep Japanese forces pinned down in China and Soviet 
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advisory programs as of 1937 were all geared towards keeping the Chinese from 
surrendering or signing an armistice with Japan.  Russian attitudes towards American 
advisors were equally cynical.  The lead Soviet advisor was suspicious of Chennault and 
would try to avoid talking to Chinese Air Force leadership when Chennault was present.  
According to Daniel Ford: 
 Asanov was right to be suspicious: Chennault sent regular bulletins to the 
army adjutant general in Washington.  In May 1938, he forwarded drawings and 
specifications of the open-cockpit Mitsubishi A5M, and when the Japanese Army 
introduced a new fighter to China—the Nakajima Ki-27—Chennault filed a report 
on that as well.  As Asanov feared, he [Chennault] also wrote about Soviet 
equipment and tactics.  In a dogfight, he reported, a Japanese pilot would glue 
himself to the Russian’s tail, from which position nothing could shake him.  The 
Russians soon learned to put their Polikarpovs into a power dive when hard-
pressed by the nimble Japanese, then zoom back to altitude and attack from 
above—a tactic very similar to the one Chennault had proposed for use against 
fast bombers.90 
It later appeared to some observers that the structure, mission and even the tactics of the 
1st American Volunteer Group were copied wholesale from the Soviet aviation effort that 
Chennault witnessed during the first years of the Second Sino-Japanese War.  There was 
probably some validity to these claims, although Chennault had written extensively on 
fighter operations against bombers when he was an instructor at Maxwell Field.  His 
experiences in China only strengthened his belief in the effectiveness of properly 
employed pursuit aircraft.  Chennault did, however, become convinced after watching 
Soviet operations against the Japanese that the introduction of a small group of highly 
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trained American aviators would have an effect that would be even more decisive than 
the introduction of Soviet combat units.  Rather than wasting time and resources 
struggling to train Chinese pilots who were destined to either be shot down by a Japanese 
ace or crash on a poorly maintained aerodrome while attempting to land, Chennault 
envisioned the creation of a unit of American airmen that would engage the Japanese on 
equal terms and give the Chinese Nationalists a chance to regain some of the territory lost 
to the Japanese invasion. 
 Chennault would soon have his opportunity to push his idea for an American 
combat unit and provide the kind of direct combat assistance that the Soviet Union had 
offered for the first three years of the war.  In the middle of October, 1940, Chennault 
was summoned to Jiang Jieshi’s headquarters to offer his views on a new plan crafted by 
the Guomindang’s leader.  The Generalissimo, fearful of the continued battering that 
Chinese cities were suffering from Japanese aerial assaults, wanted to “buy the latest 
American fighters and hire American pilots to fly them.”91  Chennault was intrigued by 
the idea but pessimistic about the chances of successfully organizing such an effort.  The 
American government was reluctant, if not actively hostile, to the idea of directly 
assisting China in their struggle against the Japanese.  Furthermore, Chennault knew from 
his contacts in the U.S. Army that every front-line fighter that could be spared from a 
quickly expanding Air Corps was being shipped to Great Britain to assist the British 
government in their struggle against Germany and Italy.  In his opinion, none of the older 
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U.S. designs, including the P-40, were really capable of taking on the nimble Nate and 
Zero fighters that were dominating the skies of China in 1940.   
However, the political climate in Washington D.C. had changed in significant 
ways since 1937.  When Franklin Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term as 
President in 1940, he immediately sought for ways to assist the Chinese in their struggle 
against Japanese aggression.  While the State Department and War Department were still 
reluctant to support any increased aid or assistance programs for China, there were pro-
Chinese elements in the Roosevelt administration.  According to Xu, China had 
“powerful allies among a small influential group in the White House.  Led by President 
Franklin Roosevelt, this group included Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Secretary of War Henry Stimson.”92  This group 
initially debated the merits of sending five hundred American aircraft to China, but soon 
realized the impossibility of such a large grant when every spare fighter was being 
shipped to England for combat against the Luftwaffe.  At the end of 1940, Chennault and 
Dr. Soong were informed by Secretary Morgenthau that the President had agreed for 
twelve B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and twenty-four American aviators to be 
transferred from the Philippines to China.  However, Army Chief of Staff George C. 
Marshall strongly disapproved of this plan.  After conferring privately with General 
Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Presidential advisor Lauchlin Currie, Morgenthau 
informed Chennault and the Chinese delegation that one hundred P-40 fighters would be 
transferred from the Army instead of the twelve B-17s.93  It was the promise of these one 
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hundred fighters that would officially create the 1st American Volunteer Group on 
August 1, 1941.94  The presence of this volunteer group changed the American aviation 
effort in China from a training and advising mission to a government-supported (though 
still privately employed) direct assistance mission.  As the Flying Tigers began training at 
a Burmese airfield in August, it appeared that one hundred fighters was all that the United 
States was prepared to send against the Japanese.  However, the events of December 7, 
1941 would quickly change the aviation situation in China and temporarily remove any 
need for a rebuilt Chinese Air Force.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  TWO FAILED AIRPOWER MISSIONS IN CHINA 
 
 
 The morning of December 7, 1941found the 1st American Volunteer Group as 
unprepared for open war as any other U.S. unit in the Pacific theater.  According to 
Daniel Ford, “the men slumbered until reveille, got up, ate breakfast, and went to their 
stations.  The news broke up on them at 7 A.M.”95  The Flying Tigers had approximately 
the same number of trained P-40 pilots as they had airframes—sixty of both.  When 
compared to the Japanese forces that were, in the words of AVG historian Olga 
Greenlaw, “rushing up and down the globe like mad dogs, frothing at the mouth and 
biting everything in sight,” the American volunteers in Burma would become much more 
valuable as a morale booster for an enraged U.S. public than as a truly effective combat 
unit.96  Events across the Pacific also quashed any notion of the Flying Tigers remaining 
a Chinese unit.  In a memo to President Roosevelt, advisor Lauchlin Currie wrote that 
“there was no longer any reason to pretend that Chennault’s airmen were volunteers in 
the service of China.”  If, or more accurately, when the 1st AVG was inducted into U.S. 
service, they would be transformed into an “American task force.”97  The first elements 
of the 2nd AVG—Chennault’s bomber group—were stopped by U.S. officials in 
Australia and promptly inducted into the U.S. Army.  The Lockheed bombers that were 
slated for duty with the 2nd AVG were also stopped before they could leave Burbank, 
CA and re-assigned to the Army Air Corp.  The fate of the two American volunteer 
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groups could be best summed up by the telegram sent by T.V. Soong to Claire Chennault 
on December 13, 1941:  “Pending clarification future policy of U.S.A. army and navy air 
force all recruitment for A.V.G. suspended. Suggest you temporary absorb all personnel 
including 49 men slated for bombardment group arrived on SS Bloemfontein in your 
present organization. Upon request of U.S.A. authority 10th group which was slated to 
leave Los Angeles on December 11 being released for re-induction into U.S.A. air 
force…”98  The U.S. Army did not make the transition easy for the Flying Tigers, 
however, and when the official induction board visited the AVG bases in June 1942, only 
six pilots, most of them flight leads such as David “Tex” Hill, volunteered to stay and fly 
as part of the growing China Air Task Force.  One member of the unit noted that “they 
had been out of step with their complacent, isolationist country when they signed up the 
year before; now they were out of step once more.”99 
 The pending absorption of the Flying Tigers into the rapidly mobilizing U.S. 
Army Air Corps would also mark the end of private American advisory efforts at 
Kunming and the surrounding airfields.  U.S. officials would inform all of the American 
instructors that their services were needed in support of American military operations 
against the Japanese.  The Chinese flight school at Yunnan was employing six former 
U.S. Army Air Corps flight instructors as check pilots but by the end of April 1942, all 
six had agreed to transfer to the China Air Task Force and work directly for the newly-
promoted Brigadier General Chennault.100 
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 By the end of 1942, it was clear to everyone involved with the Chinese 
Nationalist Air Force that the advisory efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States 
had failed to produce a modern, capable air service for Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang.  
How did two future super powers fail in what seemed a fairly straightforward training 
mission?  The unsatisfactory results of these efforts were not due to one or two stumbling 
blocks but, rather, a host of nation-specific political, organizational and cultural factors 
that prevented any sort of lasting progress from being firmly established.  While both the 
Soviet Union and the United States included some positive elements in their advisory 
missions, it was the overall interaction of these three factors that resulted in an ineffective 
and poorly-trained Chinese Air Force. 
Politically, the Soviet Union viewed China as a needed counter-balance to 
Japanese aggression.  Stalin and his subordinates were more than willing to assist the 
National Revolutionary Army and its air service if such assistance served the geopolitical 
interests of the Soviet Union.  The Second Sino-Japanese War also offered the Soviet 
Union the same opportunity as the Spanish Civil War—an arena to test new aircraft and 
tactics while also providing Soviet pilots and ground crews the invaluable combat 
experience that would be needed in the event of a foreign attack on the Soviet Union.  
Finally, the Soviet aviation effort in China gave Stalin some needed leverage, so to speak, 
when negotiating with Japan for potential treaties or non-aggression pacts.  If Japanese 
leaders wanted Stalin to stop assisting and supporting the Chinese Air Force, they would 
have to offer some sort of diplomatic or military arrangement in return.  However, this 
realpolitik approach to advisory operations encouraged the Soviet pilots and ground 
crews to plan and operate in a sort of isolation that limited meaningful interaction with 
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their Chinese counterparts.  Soviet aircrews were sent to China to pursue Soviet interests 
and if those interests suddenly demanded that the Soviet effort be terminated, the 
advisory effort was quickly and quietly brought to an end.   
 Organizationally, the Soviet advisory group was structured along military lines.  
When Stalin decided to provide aviation aid to the Chinese Nationalists, he directed 
Komissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov to “assemble the best volunteer aviators and send 
to China a squadron of I-16 fighters (31 aircraft, 101 men) and a squadron of SB bombers 
(31 aircraft, 153 men.)”101  This early Soviet effort also benefited from the presence of 
experienced aviators who had flown combat missions in Spain.  These “Spaniards”—
Y.V. Smushkevich, P.I. Pumpur, G.N. Zakharov, and others—provided a repository of 
advisory experience that would be invaluable in organizing a similar effort in China102.  
The Soviet advisory group, unlike any other foreign effort, consisted of training and 
deploying entire units, not individuals sent as personal envoys or directly hired through 
private channels.  The establishment of an official Soviet military presence inside China 
also expedited the transfer of large numbers of I-15 and I-16 fighter aircraft to the 
Chinese Air Force.  The deployment of autonomous Soviet pursuit and bomber units also 
allowed the Soviet aviators to form mixed Soviet/Chinese crews on Soviet bombers and 
provide some training opportunities during long-range strike missions.  The most 
important element of this Soviet organizational scheme was the command structure.  
Rather than working for Jiang Jieshi and drawing a salary—usually delayed by red 
tape—from the Commission for Aeronautical Affairs, the Soviet aviators and ground 
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crews were under the direct control of Soviet officers, who in turn took their orders from 
Soviet leaders in Moscow.  This arrangement prevented Chinese aviation personnel from 
viewing their Soviet counterparts as foreign mercenaries or paid employees of the 
Guomindang and thereby avoided introducing any confusion in the nature of their 
relationship.  This “Allies rather than employees” nature of the Soviet advisory effort 
would give them an authority that was denied to other similar endeavors, such as the 
Jouett mission and Claire Chennault’s efforts as an advisor to Jiang Jieshi.  However, the 
Soviet Air Force would labor under a potentially devastating organizational handicap in 
the late 1930s.  When Soviet leader Josef Stalin purged the military ranks between 1937 
and 1939, the Red Air Force would lose some of its top officers, including Y.V. 
Smushkevich, one of the architects of the advisory effort in China.  According to Higham 
and Kipp, “Soviet aviation was hard hit by the purge…about 75 percent of the senior 
officers in the VVS had been eliminated by the end of 1939.”103  Any combat experience 
and tactical knowledge that had been gained in the aerial campaigns against the Japanese 
were more than off-set by the disastrous effects of Stalin’s rampage against the leaders of 
Soviet military aviation.  As early as 1937, Soviet archives indicated that some Soviet 
units were operating without group commanders.  According to Soviet archives, “the 
answer to the question of why, after the death of V. Kurdyumov, the group remained 
without a commander is only in the memoirs of Rytov.  It seems that the deputy 
commander of the group, Sizov (possibly, the name has been changed), in that very 
difficult situation did not wish to assume complete responsibility and categorically 
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refused to accept command.”104  Without experienced and motivated leadership, any 
advisory effort will eventually grind to a halt, and the end of the Soviet effort in 1940 
seemed to coincide perfectly with the internal destruction of the Red Air Force’s top 
echelons. 
 Culturally, the Soviet Air Force possessed some seemingly advantageous qualities 
with respect to advisory operations in China.  The Soviet Air Force shared a common 
border with China and fielded aviation units in the Far East (most of the volunteers for 
the first group of Soviet aviators were from Red Air Force units stationed in Siberia.)  
The Soviet aviators and ground crewmen sent to China also shared a similar 
organizational culture with the Chinese Nationalist Air Force.  Both organizations served 
authoritarian leaders who used the very real threat of execution to back up their orders.  
Both air services shared a common enemy in the aerial arms of the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Navy.  Both the Soviets and the Chinese also possessed leaders who placed a 
premium on what Western observers termed “face”—the close attention to decorum and 
reputation that was a hallmark of East Asian social relations.  Claire Chennault remarked 
on this Soviet and Chinese preoccupation with “face” in his autobiography: 
The only time I had any difficulties with the Russians occurred during a 
conference with General Asanov and General Chow on the field at Nanchang.  
Conversation was trilingual with three interpreters stretching simple chatter on the 
weather into a half-hour harangue.  While we were talking, the first air raid alarm 
sounded.  Russian planes warmed up and took off.  I saw the second red ball 
hoisted [signaling enemy aircraft 5 minutes away] but neither Asanov nor Chow 
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showed any signs of taking cover.  I suggested to Asanov through our interpreters 
that we leave. 
“Oh no, I cannot go until Chow does or I will lose face,” he replied.  
 I suggested to Chow that we leave.   
“Oh no, I cannot go until Asanov does or I will lose face,” Chow replied.   
“Tell them both I’d rather lose face than my life,” I shouted at my 
interpreter, Colonel Hsu, leading a mad dash for the graveyard that served as a 
local air-raid shelter.105 
 
Therefore, in terms of organizational attitudes and operating procedures, Soviet and 
Chinese aviators were much more akin to each other than American aviation personnel.   
There were other important cultural factors that would also have a large impact on 
later operations.  Soviet aircraft given to the Chinese Air Force possessed some 
technological characteristics that were a direct result of Soviet cultural attitudes towards 
military equipment.  Soviet designers have always assumed that open warfare will result 
in large losses of equipment, especially aircraft.  Given this assumption, Soviet aircraft 
have traditionally been designed to operate for only a short time, with one or two 
overhauls at most, before being discarded or, most likely, heavily damaged or destroyed 
in combat.  One report sent from an American military observer in China noted that 
“regarding Russian equipment, the statement was made that the Russian airplanes were 
built for but a short life at the front; that the Russian engines would only stand a 
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maximum of two overhauls…”106  Claire Chennault made the same observation in a 1938 
report that was sent to the U.S. Army Adjutant General in 1938:  “After March 1, the 
engines of the new [Soviet] light bombers (SB) required overhauling.  Due to the fact that 
all the planes had flown about the same time, all required motor changes at the same 
time…it is reported that they require overhaul after one hundred and ten hours.”107  
 However, the biggest cultural limiting factor for the Soviet aviators was the 
language barrier.  Even in the 1920s, Soviet advisors such as Mikhail Borodin had been 
forced to resort to a third language (English) in order to communicate with their 
Guomindang hosts.  The same limitations applied to the Soviet flyers and ground 
personnel in the late 1930s.  While a small number of Chinese aviators had been trained 
in the Soviet Union, the Soviet pilots and ground crewmen still needed a large number of 
translators in order to perform any sort of joint operations with the Chinese Air Force.  
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Royce reported the presence of five Soviet instructors and a 
Russian language school at Chongtu in 1939, teaching Chinese personnel enough Russian 
to act as interpreters.108  The language barrier hindered all foreign advisors in China, but 
with the Soviets using deployed units of Red Air Force personnel, this cultural factor 
would be difficult to overcome.  Former missionary Paul Frillmann was the sole member 
of the Flying Tigers who spoke Chinese and vividly described the problems encountered 
by Claire Chennault and other American aviators who lived and worked with the Chinese 
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with no language skills.109  There is no proof that any of the American advisors flying 
and teaching in China possessed anything besides rudimentary language skills, and while 
some Chinese-Americans such as Arthur Chen would fly in combat against the Japanese, 
they were not employed in any effective capacity as instructors.  While American 
accounts of advisory operations in China include some information regarding language 
barriers and interpreters, the Soviet accounts are silent on the matter, and the subject of 
Soviet interpreters and military operations with non-Russian speaking forces—to include 
Mongolian, Chinese and Korean forces—would be an interesting area for future research. 
The single biggest advantage that the Soviet effort enjoyed in China was the 
large-scale deployment of entire Soviet units between 1937 and 1940.  These units were 
much larger than any individual effort that had been previously organized by either 
Soviet, American or European aviators.  The sheer size of this Soviet effort produced a 
large number of trained Chinese aircrew and ground crewmen in a short time.  The large 
number of Soviet I-15, I-16 and SB-2 aircraft also brought a standardization and 
commonality of airframes that had been sorely missing from the Chinese Air Force.  
With only a handful of different models being employed, Chinese maintenance personnel 
were able to develop the required familiarity necessary for effective ground support.  
Ironically, the biggest flaw in the Soviet effort was the fact that the Red Air Force 
concentrated so much on providing direct assistance, such as the bombing missions sent 
against Formosa, that the Chinese Air Force became dependent upon Soviet material and 
Soviet personnel to provide any kind of defense against Japanese air raids, not to mention 
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any sort of offensive capability that would assist Chinese ground forces in their struggles 
with the Japanese Army.  When Stalin signed a Non-Aggression Treaty with Japan on 
April 13, 1941, it signaled the official end of Soviet support for the Chinese Air Force, 
and the vast majority of Soviet personnel returned to western Russia to prepare for the 
German offensive that would be launched two months later.  The Soviet Union would not 
be the only nation to make the Chinese Air Force dependent upon their presence, 
however, and the arrival of the 1st American Volunteer Group in the summer of 1941 
would continue this unfortunate trend. 
Before the arrival of the Flying Tigers, however, the American advisory effort 
would shaped by a set of different political, organizational and cultural influences.  
Unlike the Soviet Union, the American aviation advisory effort in China would be a 
commercial enterprise until the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor unleashed a tidal wave of 
official U.S. assistance and support.  Even John Jouett’s original advisory mission in 
1932 was organized as a “non-military training mission” by the Commerce Department, 
an arrangement that required Colonel Jouett and his team to travel as civilians to China.  
Politically, the advisory efforts of American aviators in China were always confronted by 
the isolationist attitudes of the U.S. government.  Unlike the Soviet Union, American 
leaders were conflicted over exactly what interests they wished to pursue in East Asia.  
Business leaders seemed to feel that normal trade relations could be maintained with both 
China and Japan and that Americans should simply sell as many aircraft as possible to 
whoever would pay.  Prior to 1936, diplomats in the State Department were convinced 
that any American contact with the Guomindang, either in the form of aircraft sales or 
aviation training, would be seen as “war profiteering” and would merely prolong the civil 
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conflicts that had plagued China since 1911.  After the de facto unification of China 
under Jiang Jieshi in 1936, the State Department became increasingly convinced that U.S. 
assistance to the Chinese Nationalists would provoke Japan and jeopardize any hopes of a 
peaceful resolution to the hostilities between China and Japan.   
In terms of organization, the United States would rely on commercial efforts led 
by aviation representatives and aircraft manufacturers to train the Chinese Air Force.  
Individual aviators would be approached by Chinese officials or their American 
employees and offered large salaries and the promise of adventure in order to obtain the 
professional services needed to train a modern air force.  Even the Flying Tigers, who 
were partly inspired by the Soviet air units who fought the Japanese in the first few years 
of the air war, were a private venture, funded by the Chinese government using U.S. 
government loans.  Claire Chennault and all of his pilots and ground crews were 
employees of Jiang Jieshi and had no official remit to pursue specific U.S. foreign policy 
or geopolitical goals.  The privately employed American advisors who were still training 
Chinese airmen in 1941 operated under the same aegis as the Flying Tigers and were 
private citizens who could quit and return to the United States at any time.  This 
unofficial status introduced a lack of authority that hindered the efforts of the American 
advisors and led the Chinese pilots and ground crews to resist the efforts of the American 
pilots and maintainers.   
  The American advisors in China—including leaders such as John Jouett and 
Claire Chennault—were completely unprepared for the language and cultural barriers that 
would hinder their efforts to train the Chinese Air Force.  While the lack of language 
skills was the most glaring example, certain Chinese cultural attitudes, such as the 
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commonly mentioned issue of “saving face” and the reflexive distrust of foreign 
techniques, were also strong inhibitors to effective training operations.  Since there was 
no coordinated program and no way to transmit “lessons learned” between the different 
groups of advisors, the successive waves of American advisors that arrived in China were 
forced to confront these linguistic and cultural issues without any prior knowledge.  
American advisors, in turn, insisted on trying to turn the Chinese Air Force into a smaller, 
slightly more exotic version of the Army Air Corps, even going so far as to use the same 
syllabus and instructional material that was used for American students in American 
flight schools.  Even the informal teaching skills that American instructors brought to 
China were rendered almost useless.  In his autobiography, Claire Chennault describes 
the frustration he felt trying to explain the concept of “leading a target” to Chinese pilots 
who had never fired a shotgun at a duck or fired a bullet at any type of moving target.  
American instructors were constantly faced by this lack of a common knowledge base 
when it came to examples, figures of speech, and other constructs used in a teaching 
environment.110   
If there is a final lesson to be taken from the Soviet and American experiences 
with the Chinese Air Force in the period under consideration, it would be the importance 
of non-material factors such as politics, organizational structure and culture with regards 
to aviation training in a foreign setting.  The introduction of large numbers of advanced 
aircraft may seem like a solution, but it can actually have a negative effect in terms of the 
problems it causes for maintenance and training.  Both the Soviet Union and the United 
enjoyed some successes with foreign aviation training in the Cold War.  The Soviet 
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Union would successfully train both Warsaw Pact air units and Third World air forces 
and the United States would set the standard for NATO air units in the decades following 
the Second World War.  However, the United States would experience the same kinds of 
problems in Vietnam trying to train the Vietnamese National Air Force (VNAF) that 
American advisors encountered in China three decades earlier.  Politics, organization and 
culture would also have their own adverse impact on aviation training in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the twenty-first century and it remains to be seen if either the Iraqi or 
Afghani air forces will be capable of independent operations without massive U.S. 
support.  Aviation training in a foreign setting may seem to be dominated by advanced 
technology and modern science but, as the experiences of Soviet and American advisors 
in China during the 1930s have demonstrated, politics, organizational structure and 
culture are the primary factors that determine either success or failure for the foreign 
pilots and ground crews being trained. 
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